首页> 外文期刊>Journal of financial economics >Good disclosure, bad disclosure
【24h】

Good disclosure, bad disclosure

机译:良好的披露,不良的披露

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           

摘要

We study real-efficiency implications of disclosing public information in a model with multiple dimensions of uncertainty where market prices convey information to a real decision maker. Paradoxically, when disclosure concerns a variable that the real decision maker cares to learn about, disclosure negatively affects price informativeness, and in markets that are effective in aggregating private information, this negative price-informativeness effect can dominate so that better disclosure negatively impacts real efficiency. When disclosure concerns a variable that the real decision maker already knows much about, disclosure always improves price informativeness and real efficiency. Our analysis has important empirical and policy implications for different contexts such as disclosure of stress test information and regulation of credit ratings.
机译:我们在具有多个不确定性维度的模型中研究公开信息的真实效率含义,其中市场价格将信息传达给真实的决策者。矛盾的是,当披露涉及实际决策者关心的变量时,披露会对价格信息产生负面影响,并且在有效汇总私人信息的市场中,这种负面的价格信息效应会占主导地位,因此更好的披露会对真实效率产生负面影响。 。当披露涉及实际决策者已经非常了解的变量时,披露总是会提高价格信息和真实效率。我们的分析对于不同的环境(例如,压力测试信息的披露和信用评级的监管)具有重要的经验和政策含义。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号