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The role of executive cash bonuses in providing individual and team incentives

机译:高管现金奖金在提供个人和团队激励方面的作用

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摘要

Given CEOs' substantial equity portfolios, much recent literature on CEO incentives regards cash-based bonus plans as largely irrelevant, begging the question of why nearly all CEO compensation plans include such bonuses. We develop a new measure of bonus plan incentives and show that performance sensitivities are much greater than prior estimates. We also test hypotheses regarding the role of bonuses in providing executives with individualized and team incentives. We find little evidence supporting the individualized incentives hypotheses but find consistent evidence that bonus plans appear to be used to encourage mutual monitoring and to facilitate coordination across the top management team as a whole. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机译:鉴于CEO拥有大量股票投资组合,最近有关CEO激励的文献都认为基于现金的奖金计划基本上无关紧要,这引起了为什么几乎所有CEO薪酬计划都包括这样的奖金的问题。我们开发了一种新的奖金计划激励措施,并表明绩效敏感性远高于先前的估计。我们还检验了有关奖金在向高管提供个性化和团队激励方面的作用的假设。我们发现很少有证据支持个性化激励假说,但是找到了一致的证据表明,奖金计划似乎被用来鼓励相互监督并促进整个高层管理团队之间的协调。 (C)2019 Elsevier B.V.保留所有权利。

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