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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of financial economics >Stock options and managerial incentives for risk taking:Evidence from FAS 123R
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Stock options and managerial incentives for risk taking:Evidence from FAS 123R

机译：股票期权和管理冒险的激励措施：FAS 123R的证据

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摘要

We provide new evidence on the relation between option-based compensation and risk-taking behavior by exploiting the change in the accounting treatment of stock options following the adoption of FAS 123R in 2005. The implementation of FAS 123R represents an exogenous change in the accounting benefits of stock options that has no effect on the economic costs and benefits of options for providing managerial incentives. Our results do not support the view that the convexity inherent in option-based compensation is used to reduce risk-related agency problems between managers and shareholders. We show that all firms dramatically reduce their usage of stock options (convexity) after the adoption of FAS 123R and that the decline in option use is strongly associated with a proxy for accounting costs. Little evidence exists that the decline in option usage following the accounting change results in less risky investment and financial policies.
机译：通过利用2005年采用FAS 123R之后对股票期权的会计处理方式的变化，我们提供了有关基于期权的薪酬与冒险行为之间关系的新证据。FAS123R的实施代表了会计利益的外在变化对提供管理激励措施的期权的经济成本和收益没有影响的股票期权。我们的结果并不支持这样一种观点，即基于期权的薪酬所固有的凸性用于减少经理和股东之间与风险相关的代理问题。我们证明，采用FAS 123R后，所有公司都大大减少了对股票期权的使用（凸性），并且期权使用的下降与会计成本的代理关系密切。几乎没有证据表明随着会计变更而导致的期权使用下降导致风险较小的投资和财务政策。

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