...
首页> 外文期刊>Journal of health economics >The design of long term care insurance contracts
【24h】

The design of long term care insurance contracts

机译:长期护理保险合同的设计

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           

摘要

This paper studies the design of long term care (LTC) insurance contracts in the presence of ex post moral hazard. While this problem bears some similarity with the study of health insurance (Blomqvist, 1997) the significance of informal LTC affects the problem in several crucial ways. It introduces the potential crowding out of informal care by market care financed through insurance coverage. Furthermore, the information structure becomes more intricate. Informal care is not publicly observable and, unlike the insurer, caregivers know the true needs of their relatives. We determine the optimal second-best contract and show that the optimal reimbursement rate can be written as an A-B-C expression a la Diamond (1998). These terms respectively reflect the efficiency loss as measured by the inverse of the demand elasticity, the distribution of needs and the preferences for risk sharing. Interestingly, informal care directly affects only the first term. More precisely the first term decreases with the presence and significance of informal care. Roughly speaking this means that an efficient LTC insurance contract should offer lower (marginal) reimbursement rates than its counterpart in a health insurance context. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机译:本文研究存在事后道德风险的长期护理(LTC)保险合同的设计。虽然这个问题与健康保险的研究有一些相似之处(Blomqvist,1997年),但非正式LTC的重要性以几种关键方式影响了这一问题。它介绍了通过保险承保的市场服务可能会挤出非正式服务。此外,信息结构变得更加复杂。非正式护理不是公众可以观察到的,而且与保险公司不同,护理人员知道其亲属的真正需求。我们确定了最优的第二好合同,并证明了最优报销率可以写成La Diamond(1998)的A-B-C表达式。这些术语分别反映了效率损失,该损失是由需求弹性,需求分布和风险共担偏好的倒数来衡量的。有趣的是,非正式护理仅直接影响第一学期。更确切地说,随着非正式护理的出现和重要性,第一学期减少。粗略地说,这意味着有效的LTC保险合同提供的(边际)报销费率应低于健康保险背景下的(边际)报销率。 (C)2016 Elsevier B.V.保留所有权利。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号