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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of institutional economics >The revolving door, state connections, and inequality of influence in the financial sector
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The revolving door, state connections, and inequality of influence in the financial sector

机译：金融部门的旋转门，国家关系和影响力不平等

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This paper shows that the revolving door generates inequality of influence between financial firms and creates economic distortions. We first develop a theoretical model, introducing the notion of "bureaucratic capital" and stressing how the revolving door generates inequality in bureaucratic capital leading to inequality in profits. Then this prediction is tested, using a new database that tracks the revolving door process involving the 20 biggest US "diversified banks." We show that regulators who supply a large stock of bureaucratic capital are more likely to be hired by the top five banks. We also develop indices of the inequality of influence between banks. We show that banks in the top revenue quintile concentrate around 80% of revolving door movements. Goldman Sachs appears as the prime beneficiary of this process, capturing approximately 30% of the total stock of bureaucratic capital.
机译：本文表明，旋转门在金融公司之间产生了影响力的不平等并造成了经济扭曲。我们首先建立一个理论模型，介绍“官僚资本”的概念，并强调旋转门如何在官僚资本中产生不平等，从而导致利润不平等。然后，使用一个新的数据库来跟踪这一预测，该数据库将跟踪涉及美国20家最大的“多元化银行”的旋转门过程。我们显示，提供大量官僚资本的监管机构更有可能被前五名雇用银行。我们还开发了银行之间影响力不平等的指标。我们显示，收入最高的五分之一的银行集中了80％的旋转门动作。高盛似乎是这一过程的主要受益者，约占官僚资本总额的30％。

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