• 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文期刊>Journal of institutional economics >The revolving door, state connections, and inequality of influence in the financial sector
【24h】

The revolving door, state connections, and inequality of influence in the financial sector

机译：金融部门影响的旋转门，国家连接和不等式

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

This paper shows that the revolving door generates inequality of influence between financial firms and creates economic distortions. We first develop a theoretical model, introducing the notion of "bureaucratic capital" and stressing how the revolving door generates inequality in bureaucratic capital leading to inequality in profits. Then this prediction is tested, using a new database that tracks the revolving door process involving the 20 biggest US "diversified banks." We show that regulators who supply a large stock of bureaucratic capital are more likely to be hired by the top five banks. We also develop indices of the inequality of influence between banks. We show that banks in the top revenue quintile concentrate around 80% of revolving door movements. Goldman Sachs appears as the prime beneficiary of this process, capturing approximately 30% of the total stock of bureaucratic capital.
机译：本文表明，旋转门产生了金融公司之间影响的不等式，并创造了经济扭曲。我们首先发展理论模型，介绍了“官僚资本”的概念，并强调旋转门如何在官僚资本中产生不平等，导致利润不平等。然后使用跟踪涉及20最大“多样化银行”的旋转门过程的新数据库来测试此预测。我们展示提供大量官僚资本存量的监管机构更有可能被前五个银行聘用。我们还开发银行之间影响不平等的指数。我们展示了顶级收入中的银行，总体集中在旋转门移动的80％左右。高盛称为这一进程的主要受益者，占官僚资本总量的30％。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号