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The Social Network: The European Commission' Decision on the Facebook/Whatsapp Merger Case

机译:社交网络:欧盟委员会对Facebook / Whatsapp合并案的裁决

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摘要

First, Facebook/WhatsApp further endorses the regulatory approach followed by the European Commission for the appraisal of mergers in dynamic innovation-driven markets. The framework for the assessment of such transactions rests on the idea, among other things, that markets shares are of limited relevance to establish whether a merger may significantly impede competition in markets where innovation takes place at a fast pace and market shares are then unstable, such as the markets for consumer communication and social network services. Mergers between firms operating in such markets are unlikely to create competition problems and, accordingly, should be approved by the European Commission. Firms planning to acquire competitors in technology markets having competition conditions similar to those depicted above may then submit the short cycle of innovation and volatility of market shares as factors mitigating the possible negative effects on competition expected from the merger. Second, Facebook/WhatsApp is consistent with the prevailing position under EU competition law, according to which there is no room for privacy risks in the context of merger control unless such risks threaten competition. Third and finally, the Facebook/WhatsApp decision appears to have framed the potential competition harms arising from Big Data mergers as market foreclosure. In other words, the question to be addressed is whether the concentration of a substantial amount of data in the hands of the merged entity may lessen competition by impeding or frustrating the access of competitors to the data they need to supply their customers.
机译:首先,Facebook / WhatsApp进一步认可了监管方法,随后欧盟委员会对动态创新驱动市场中的合并进行了评估。评估此类交易的框架基于以下想法:除其他外,市场份额的关联性有限,无法确定合并是否会严重阻碍创新快速发展且市场份额不稳定的市场竞争,例如消费者交流和社交网络服务市场。在这样的市场中运营的公司之间的合并不太可能造成竞争问题,因此,应经欧盟委员会批准。计划在竞争条件与上述竞争条件相似的技术市场中收购竞争对手的公司可能会提出创新周期和市场份额波动的短周期,作为减轻合并可能对竞争造成负面影响的因素。其次,Facebook / WhatsApp与欧盟竞争法规定的现行立场一致,根据该立场,在合并控制的范围内不存在隐私风险的空间,除非此类风险威胁竞争。第三点也是最后一点,Facebook / WhatsApp的决定似乎已经将大数据合并带来的潜在竞争危害归结为市场止赎。换句话说,要解决的问题是,合并实体手中大量数据的集中是否会通过阻碍或阻碍竞争者获取其提供给客户的数据的访问权而减少竞争。

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  • 来源
    《Journal of internet law》 |2016年第7期|115-20|共7页
  • 作者

    Michele Giannino;

  • 作者单位

    University of Leicester (UK), University of London;

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  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
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