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Power to the People? An Experimental Analysis of Bottom-Up Accountability of Third-Party Institutions

机译:给人民权力?第三方机构自下而上的责任制的实验分析

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摘要

This article provides an experimental investigation of third parties' sanctioning behavior, in order to understand whether public officials (e.g., judges, politicians, or regulators), when deciding about top-down interventions aimed at punishing wrongdoers, are sensitive to bottom-up pressure on the part of ordinary citizens, who are the major victims of wrongdoers' behavior. We set up a novel five-treatment design and compare situations where a wrongdoer acts under: (1) no third-party punishment; (2) nonaccountable third-party punishment; and (3) accountable third-party punishment. We show that when citizens are active and make their voice heard, public officials sanction wrongdoing significantly more. Our experimental finding complements previous empirical work based on field data and suggests that when third-party institutions are held accountable, their propensity to fight misconduct is higher, other things equal. We view this result as good news with regard to domains where it implies that pro-consumer policies will be more likely (e.g., regulatory policies). The risk of pandering by elected officials and the danger of poorly informed decisions by the citizens are the flip side of the argument.
机译:本文提供了对第三方制裁行为的实验研究,以了解在决定旨在惩罚不法行为的自上而下的干预措施时,公职人员(例如法官,政客或监管机构)是否对自下而上的压力敏感普通民众是犯罪者行为的主要受害者。我们建立了新颖的五种待遇设计,并比较了违法者在以下情况下的行为:(1)没有第三方的惩罚; (2)不负责任的第三方惩罚; (3)负责的第三方惩罚。我们表明,当公民积极活动并发出声音时,公职人员会更多地制裁不法行为。我们的实验发现补充了基于实地数据的先前经验工作,并表明,当第三方机构承担责任时,与其他行为抗衡的倾向更高。我们认为这一结果对某些领域来说是个好消息,因为这暗示着更有可能实行亲消费者政策(例如监管政策)。论点的反面是民选官员p缩的风险和公民知情的决定的风险。

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