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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of law, economics, & organization >The Effects of Electoral Incentives on Fiscal Policy: Evidence from a Legislative Change at the Local Government Level
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The Effects of Electoral Incentives on Fiscal Policy: Evidence from a Legislative Change at the Local Government Level

机译：选举激励措施对财政政策的影响：地方政府立法变革的证据

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摘要

This paper analyzes how electoral incentives shape fiscal policy, focusing on the introduction of mayoral term limits in Portugal. Applying a difference-in-differences approach, we find evidence that when a municipality has a term-limited (TL) mayor, it experiences a fall in revenues and expenditures. The effect seems to be driven by lower effort of lame-duck mayors, relative to reelection-eligible ones, to implement new investments and to obtain conditional grants from the central government, especially in election years. Although lame ducks are less opportunistic in general, the results suggest that opportunism may not decrease in municipalities whose TL mayors resign before the end of their terms and are replaced by their (eligible) vice-mayors.
机译：本文分析了选举激励机制如何塑造财政政策，重点介绍了葡萄牙对市长任期的限制。应用差异差异方法，我们发现有证据表明，当一个自治市有任期有限的市长时，它的收支会下降。相对于获得连任资格的ones子市长而言，seems脚的市长在实施新投资和获得中央政府的有条件赠款方面的努力似乎有所减少，尤其是在选举年中。尽管la子鸭一般来说机会较少，但结果表明，在其市长任期届满前辞职并由（合格的）副市长代替的市镇，机会主义可能不会减少。

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