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首页> 外文期刊>The Journal of Legislative Studies >Timing and Outcome of Legislation: Brazilian Pension Reform in a Bicameral Perspective *
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Timing and Outcome of Legislation: Brazilian Pension Reform in a Bicameral Perspective *

机译:立法的时间和成果:从两分法角度看巴西的养老金改革*

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摘要

In 1995 and 2003, Brazilian Presidents Cardoso and Lula da Silva submitted almost identical pension reform bills to Congress. However, these bills had very different fates in terms of the outcomes of congressional deliberation and the timing of enactment. What explains timing and outcomes of legislation? Using Brazilian pension reform as a case, this article explains legislative timing and outcomes from bicameral and bargaining perspectives. It examines two hypotheses: (1) bicameral incongruence of policy preferences increases the likelihood of legislative gridlock; and (2) impatience accelerates the timing of legislation. Evidence from archival research and interviews with Brazilian legislators strongly support these hypotheses.
机译:在1995年和2003年,巴西总统卡多佐和卢拉·达席尔瓦向国会提交了几乎相同的养老金改革法案。但是,这些法案在国会审议结果和颁布时间方面的命运差异很大。什么解释了立法的时间和结果?本文以巴西的养老金改革为例,从两院制和讨价还价的角度解释了立法时间和结果。它研究了两个假设:(1)政策优惠的两院制不一致会增加立法僵局的可能性; (2)不耐烦会加快立法时间。档案研究的证据和对巴西立法者的采访都强有力地支持了这些假设。

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