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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of military ethics >OTHER-THAN-INTERNET (OTI) CYBERWARFARE: CHALLENGES FOR ETHICS, LAW, AND POLICY
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OTHER-THAN-INTERNET (OTI) CYBERWARFARE: CHALLENGES FOR ETHICS, LAW, AND POLICY

机译：互联网以外的其他（OTI）网络保护：道德，法律和政策方面的挑战

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Almost all discussions of cyberwarfare, other cyber-attacks, and cyber-espionage have focused entirely on the Internet as the chief means of damage - the Internet as a 'vector,' using a term from the theory of infectious diseases. However there are a variety of means, some of which have already been used, that involve cyber-exploitation using vectors other than the Internet. Malware can be installed in the integrated circuits of computers and servers, but also in any devices attached to them - thumb drives, CDs, printers, scanners, and so on. One can also use various forms of electromagnetic radiation at a distance of meters or more to exfiltrate data or to infiltrate corrupt data. I call this large and diverse family of unwanted interference with the functioning of information processing systems other-than-lnternet (OTI) attacks on information systems. Stuxnet, and probably the 2007 Israeli corruption of Syrian air defenses, were OTI attacks. Such OTI techniques are more difficult to develop than creating malware, requiring electronic manufacturing facilities or novel technologies, and are thus accessible only to larger corporations and technologically sophisticated countries. Particularly vulnerable would be countries (like the United States and Europe) whose information processing devices are mainly produced outside of the country. Once exploitations via the Internet become harder to perpetrate, OTI exploitations are certain to grow dramatically, eventually requiring equipment for critical uses to be expensively fabricated in (and transported using) secure facilities; expensive detection measures will have to be instituted. This will create challenges for policy, law, and ethics, as well as greatly increasing the cost of many electronic devices.
机译：几乎所有有关网络战，其他网络攻击和网络间谍活动的讨论都完全将互联网视为主要的损害手段-互联网是“媒介”，使用的是传染病理论中的术语。但是，有各种各样的手段，其中一些已经被使用，涉及使用互联网以外的媒介进行网络利用。恶意软件可以安装在计算机和服务器的集成电路中，也可以安装在与其连接的任何设备中-拇指驱动器，CD，打印机，扫描仪等。人们还可以使用几米或更远距离的各种形式的电磁辐射来渗入数据或渗入损坏的数据。我将这个庞大而多样的无用干扰家族称为对信息系统的非Internet（OTI）攻击的信息处理系统的功能。 Stuxnet以及可能是2007年以色列对叙利亚防空系统的腐败都是OTI攻击。这种OTI技术比创建恶意软件更难开发，需要电子制造设施或新颖技术，因此仅大型公司和技术先进的国家才能使用。尤其易受伤害的是那些信息处理设备主要在国外生产的国家（如美国和欧洲）。一旦难以通过Internet进行攻击，OTI攻击肯定会急剧增长，最终需要在安全设施中昂贵地制造（和运输）用于关键用途的设备；必须采取昂贵的检测措施。这将给政策，法律和道德构成挑战，并大大增加许多电子设备的成本。

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