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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of pension economics and finance >Investment in employer shares, incentive alignment, and monitoring
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Investment in employer shares, incentive alignment, and monitoring

机译：投资于雇主股份，激励措施调整和监督

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摘要

It is well documented that US defined contribution pension plans are largely invested in the shares of their employer. I argue that when the (single representative) worker holds shares in the firm, he tends to monitor the manager. On the one hand, the manager and shareholders gain from the productivity of the worker. On the other hand, the manager bears the cost of being monitored by the worker, and the shareholders loose part of their ownership power to the worker. Therefore, there is an optimal ownership limit for the worker from the viewpoint of the firm. I derive conditions under which the worker will never invest in the firm's stock if he has the freedom to do so. Nevertheless, under alternative conditions, it will be advantageous for the worker to invest his pension assets heavily in company stock, even if the under-diversification cost is very high.
机译：有据可查的是，美国定额供款养老金计划主要投资于其雇主的股份。我认为，（单个代表）工人持有公司股份时，他倾向于监视经理。一方面，经理和股东从工人的生产力中受益。另一方面，管理者承担由工人监督的成本，而股东则将部分所有权转移给工人。因此，从企业的角度来看，存在对工人的最佳所有权限制。我得出一个条件，即如果工人有自由的话，永远不会投资公司的股票。然而，在替代条件下，即使多样化成本非常高，工人将退休金资产大量投资于公司股票还是有利的。

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