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首页> 外文期刊>Strategic Management Journal >TOP MANAGEMENT TEAM INCENTIVE HETEROGENEITY, STRATEGIC INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR, AND PERFORMANCE: A CONTINGENCY THEORY OF INCENTIVE ALIGNMENT
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TOP MANAGEMENT TEAM INCENTIVE HETEROGENEITY, STRATEGIC INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR, AND PERFORMANCE: A CONTINGENCY THEORY OF INCENTIVE ALIGNMENT

机译：高层管理团队激励异质性，战略投资行为和绩效：激励对齐的偶然性理论

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摘要

Research summary: We develop and test a contingency theory of the influence of top management team (TMT) performance-contingent incentives on manager-shareholder interest alignment. Our results support our theory by showing that although TMTs engage in significantly higher levels of acquisition investment when their average incentive levels increase, investors' responses to those large investments are generally negative. More importantly, however, we further find that within-TMT incentive heterogeneity conditions that effect, such that investors evaluate TMTs' large acquisition investments more positively as the variance in those top managers' incentive values increases. Thus, within-TMT incentive heterogeneity appears to increase manager-shareholder interest alignment, in the context of large acquisition investments.
机译：研究摘要：我们开发并测试了一种偶发性理论，即高管团队（TMT）绩效或激励措施对经理-股东利益一致的影响。我们的结果表明，尽管TMT的平均激励水平提高时，尽管它们参与的收购投资水平明显更高，但投资者对这些大笔投资的反应通常是负面的。但是，更重要的是，我们还发现，TMT内部激励异质性条件会产生影响，例如，随着高层管理人员激励价值的方差增加，投资者对TMT的大型收购投资的评价会更加积极。因此，在大型收购投资的背景下，TMT内部激励异质性似乎增加了经理人与股东之间的利益一致性。

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