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The seductive force of 'noumenal power': a new path (or impasse) for critical theory?

机译:“名义力量”的诱人力:批判理论的新路径(或僵局)?

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The main purpose of this paper is to examine Rainer Forst's account of 'noumenal power'. Forst's proposal for a revised 'critical theory of power' is firmly embedded in his philosophical understanding of 'the right to justification'. Whereas the latter has been extensively discussed in the secondary literature, the former has - with the exception of various exchanges that have taken place between Forst and his critics at academic conferences - received little attention. This paper is an attempt to fill this gap in the literature. Given the increasing influence of Forst's scholarly writings on paradigmatic developments in contemporary critical theory, it is imperative to scrutinize the key assumptions underlying his conception of 'noumenal power' and to assess its usefulness for overcoming the shortcomings of alternative explanatory frameworks. In order to accomplish this, the analysis is divided into four parts. The first part provides some introductory definitional reflections on the concept of power. The second part focuses on several dichotomous meanings attached to the concept of power - notably, 'soft power' vs. 'hard power', 'power to' vs. 'power over', and 'power for' vs. 'power against'. The third part elucidates the principal features of Forst's interpretation of 'noumenal power', in addition to drawing attention to his typological distinction between 'power', 'rule', 'domination', and 'violence'. The final part offers an assessment of Forst's account of 'noumenal power', arguing that, although it succeeds in avoiding the drawbacks of rival approaches, it suffers from significant limitations. The paper concludes by giving a synopsis of the vital insights that can be obtained from the preceding inquiry.
机译:本文的主要目的是研究Rainer Forst对“名义权力”的描述。福斯特关于修订“权力的批判理论”的建议牢固地植根于他对“辩护权”的哲学理解。尽管在二手文献中已经对后者进行了广泛的讨论,但是前者(除了Forst和他的批评家在学术会议上进行的各种交流之外)很少受到关注。本文试图填补文献中的空白。鉴于福斯特(Forst)的学术著作对当代批评理论的范式发展的影响越来越大,因此有必要仔细研究其“名词性权力”概念背后的关键假设,并评估其在克服替代解释框架不足方面的用处。为此,分析分为四个部分。第一部分对权力的概念进行了介绍性的定义性反思。第二部分关注与权力概念相关的几种二分式含义-分别是“软实力”与“硬实力”,“有权力”与“有权力”,“有权力”与“有权力反对” 。第三部分阐明了福斯特对“名义权力”的解释的主要特征,除了提请注意他在“权力”,“规则”,“统治”和“暴力”之间的类型区别。最后一部分提供了对Forst对“名义权力”的解释的评估,认为尽管成功地避免了竞争方法的弊端,但它仍然受到很大的限制。本文通过概述可以从前面的研究中获得的重要见解作为总结。

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