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Power, emotion, cognitive bias and legitimacy: an editorial

机译:权力,情感,认知偏见和合法性:社论

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摘要

When the power debates started with the work of Robert Dahl (1957), power was measured relative to its overt manifestation, which is the exercise of power. In the work of Lukes (1974), the analysis of power was significandy deepened to take account of the epistemic effects, and with the work of Foucault (1979) these effects also included the social ontological predispositions of social subjects, who are shaped through processes of managed socialisation, including discipline (Haugaard 2012). In their emphasis upon critique, both Lukes and Foucault focused upon domination, neglecting power-to, or power as agency. They also tended to view both epistemic and ontological aspects through a rationalist lens of elites realising their interests. Even if 3-D power made people lose sight of their real interests, or 4-D made social subjects machine-like, there was a certain logical elite-centred reason-bound sense to it. In contrast, in contemporary theory, domination is frequently tied to empowerment, so the binary opposition of domination versus empowerment (or emancipation), is no longer self-evident. Furthermore, social-ontological epistemic bias and socio-ontological transformations are no longer assumed to have a rational logic, even relative to the interests of elites. Rather they entail emotion, irrationality and cognitive selection based upon the arbitrary preferences of subjective tastes, shaped by the cacophony of Internet virtual reality. This issue opens with an essay by Manuel Cruz Ortiz de Landazuri, which explores the transition from bio-politics, as theorized by Foucault, and psycho-politics, as theorized by Byung-Chul Han and Zygmunt Bauman among others. Bio-politics was suited to characterising a world of hard bureaucratic modernity, while psycho-politics conceptualizes societies of liquid modernity. Psycho-politics is based upon emotional associations, as exemplified by likes on the Internet. Interests are obscured through an illusion of transparency, where interpretation becomes uncontested self-evident facts, therefore immune to critique. Agency no longer has any clear structural or teleological objective. Rather, agency becomes realised though a world of associations, which do not cohere, resulting in a sense of meaninglessness, akin to anomie.
机译:当权力辩论开始于罗伯特·达尔(Robert Dahl)(1957)的著作时,权力是相对于其明显表现即权力的行使来衡量的。在卢克斯(1974)的著作中,对权力的分析被深化了,以考虑到认识论的影响,而在福柯(1979)的著作中,这些影响也包括了社会主体的社会本体倾向,这些主体是通过过程而形成的。管理的社会化,包括纪律(Haugaard 2012)。在强调批判时,卢克斯和福柯都把重点放在统治上,忽略了权力或作为代理的权力。他们还倾向于通过理性主义者的精英主义者的视角,从认识论和本体论两个角度来认识自己的利益。即使3D力量使人们看不到他们的真实利益,或者4D力量使社会主体像机器一样,对它也有一定的逻辑上以精英为中心的理性束缚。相反,在当代理论中,统治常常与授权联系在一起,因此统治与授权(或解放)的二元对立不再是不言而喻的。此外,社会本体论的认知偏见和社会本体论的转变不再被认为具有理性的逻辑,即使相对于精英的利益也是如此。相反,它们需要基于主观品味的任意偏好的情感,非理性和认知选择,这些偏好是由互联网虚拟现实的嘈杂声所塑造的。本期文章以曼努埃尔·克鲁兹·奥尔蒂斯·德·兰达祖里的一篇论文作为开篇,该论文探讨了由福柯提出的从生物政治过渡到由Byung-Chul Han和Zygmunt Bauman提出的心理政治过渡。生物政治学适合刻画一个刻板的官僚现代性世界,而心理政治学则将流动性现代社会概念化。心理政治建立在情感联系的基础上,例如互联网上的喜欢。透明的错觉掩盖了利益,在这种情况下,解释变成了毫无争议的不言而喻的事实,因此不受批评。代理商不再具有任何明确的结构或目的论目标。相反,通过世界之间的联系不融洽,代理才得以实现,这导致了一种无意义的感觉,类似于失范。

著录项

  • 来源
    《Journal of power》 |2019年第3期|1-3|共3页
  • 作者

    Mark Haugaard;

  • 作者单位

    National University of Ireland Galway;

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  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
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