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Windows of opportunity: legislative fragmentation conditions the effect of partisanship on product market deregulation

机译:机遇之窗:立法分散限制党派关系对产品市场放松管制的影响

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摘要

Previous research on deregulation in industrialised countries emphasises differences between left-wing and right-wing parties, but data on product market regulation (PMR) indicate that these differences have been modest. If partisan preferences on the merits of deregulation differ sharply, why such modest differences? We argue that partisan differences only become pronounced when the government is strong and rules a relatively unified legislature. Thus, legislative fragmentation should reduce the left-right difference in PMR. We test this theory against PMR data in 29 industrialised countries, 1978-2007. We find that right-wing governments only have a strong negative effect on regulation if the legislature and the government are not fragmented.
机译:先前在工业化国家进行放松管制的研究强调左翼与右翼政党之间的差异,但是有关产品市场监管(PMR)的数据表明,这些差异很小。如果党派对放松管制优劣的偏好大相径庭,那为什么会有这种适度的差异呢?我们认为,只有当政府强大并统治一个相对统一的立法机构时,党派分歧才会变得明显。因此,立法上的分歧应减少PMR的左右差异。我们针对1978-2007年29个工业化国家/地区的PMR数据测试了该理论。我们发现,只有立法机关和政府不零碎,右翼政府才会对监管产生强烈的负面影响。

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