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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Public Policy >Partisan brand name building and deficit politics: examining the role of power sharing on party issue consistency
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Partisan brand name building and deficit politics: examining the role of power sharing on party issue consistency

机译：党派品牌建设与赤字政治：探讨权力共享在政党议题一致性上的作用

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摘要

Scholars of political parties frequently note that a party's candidates are aided by the presence of a consistent and favourable party brand name. We argue that partisan success in maintaining a consistent position on important policy issues hinges on how their role in the government motivates their strategies about public policy formation. Specifically, when parties share control of government institutions, parties need to balance their electoral interest in promoting a consistent brand name with the need to generate public policy that leads to effective governance. When control is held by one party, the costs and benefits of effective governance are born entirely by the majority, absolving both parties of the need to compromise on the substance of policy. By employing item response theory methods to assess patterns of party voting on deficit issues, we find strong support for these hypotheses.
机译：政党学者经常注意到，一个政党候选人始终如一地拥有一个良好的政党品牌名称。我们认为，党派在重要政策问题上保持一致立场的成功取决于他们在政府中的角色如何激励其制定公共政策的战略。具体而言，当政党共享对政府机构的控制权时，政党需要在促进统一品牌名称的选举兴趣与制定可导致有效治理的公共政策之间取得平衡。当控制权由一个政党控制时，有效治理的成本和收益完全由多数人承担，从而使双方都不必在政策实质上做出妥协。通过采用项目响应理论方法评估当事方对赤字问题的投票方式，我们为这些假设提供了有力的支持。

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