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Spillovers from regulating corporate campaign contributions

机译：监管公司竞选捐款产生的溢出效应

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摘要

Populist clamor and recent Supreme Court decisions have renewed calls for increased regulation of corporate money in politics. Few empirical estimates exist, however, on the implications of existing rules on firms' political spending. Exploiting within firm-cycle cross-candidate variation and across firm-cycle variation, we demonstrate that the regulation of PAC campaign contributions generates large spillovers into other corporate political expenditures such as lobbying. Using both high dimensional fixed effects and regression discontinuity designs, we demonstrate that firms constrained by campaign contribution limits spend between $549,000 and $1.6M more on lobbying per election cycle, an amount that is more than 100 times the campaign contribution limit. These results demonstrate that, similar to regulations in other domains of the economy, constraining specific corporate political activities often yields unintended effects.
机译：民粹主义的喧嚣和最高法院最近的判决再次呼吁加强对企业资金在政治上的监管。但是，对于现有规则对企业政治支出的影响，很少有经验估计。在企业周期交叉候选变量之间以及整个企业周期变量之间进行开发，我们证明了PAC竞选捐款的监管会产生大量溢出效应，从而渗入其他公司政治支出，例如游说。使用高维固定效应和回归不连续性设计，我们证明了受竞选捐款限制约束的公司在每个选举周期的游说支出增加了549,000美元至160万美元，这是竞选捐款限额的100倍以上。这些结果表明，与经济其他领域的法规类似，限制特定的公司政治活动通常会产生意想不到的影响。

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