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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of regulatory economics >To favor more or less? Corporate lobbying over preferential treatment to state-owned enterprises
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To favor more or less? Corporate lobbying over preferential treatment to state-owned enterprises

机译：赞成或多或少？公司游说对国有企业的优惠待遇

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摘要

In OECD and many other countries, state-owned public enterprises normally receive various forms of exclusive preferential treatment that directly affect the profits of all firms, motivating firms to lobby politicians. Using the common agency approach, we show that when state ownership of public enterprises is sufficiently low, i.e., the privatization process is sufficiently advanced, corporate lobbying boosts preferential treatment, causing public enterprises to advance as the playing field is tilted in their favor. Conversely, when state ownership is high, corporate lobbying can reduce preferential treatment, causing public enterprises to retreat as the playing field levels.
机译：在经合组织和许多其他国家，国有公营企业通常会获得各种形式的排他性优惠待遇，这些优惠直接影响所有企业的利润，从而促使企业游说政治家。我们使用共同代理的方法表明，当国有企业的国有所有权足够低时，即私有化进程已足够推进，公司游说会促进优惠待遇，导致公共企业在竞争环境向有利于他们的方向发展。相反，当国有制较高时，公司游说会减少优惠待遇，导致公营企业在公平竞争环境中退缩。

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