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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of regulatory economics >Towards equilibrium offers in unit commitment auctions with nonconvex costs
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Towards equilibrium offers in unit commitment auctions with nonconvex costs

机译：在具有非凸成本的单位承诺拍卖中实现均衡报价

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摘要

We compare two types of uniform-price auction formats commonly used in wholesale electricity markets-centrally committed and self-committed markets. Auctions in both markets are conducted by an independent system operator that collects generator bids and determines which generators will operate and how much electricity each will produce. In centrally committed markets, generators submit two-part bids consisting of a startup cost and a variable energy cost. Self-committed markets force generators to incorporate their startup costs into a one-part energy bid. The system operator in a centrally committed system ensures that each generator recovers the startup and energy costs stated in its two-part bid, while no such guarantees are made in self-committed markets. The energy cost ranking and incentive properties of these market designs remains an open question. While the system operator can determine the most efficient dispatch with a centralized market, the auction mechanism used to solicit generator data compels generators to overstate costs. Self commitment might involve less efficient dispatch but have better incentive properties. We derive Nash equilibria for both market designs in a symmetric duopoly setting. We also derive simple conditions under which the two market designs will be expected cost-equivalent.
机译：我们比较了批发电力市场中常用的两种统一价格拍卖形式-集中承诺市场和自我承诺市场。在这两个市场上的拍卖都是由独立的系统运营商进行的，该系统运营商会收集发电机出价，并确定将运行的发电机以及每台发电机将产生多少电量。在集中承诺的市场中，发电商提交包括启动成本和可变能源成本的两部分投标。自我承诺的市场迫使发电商将其启动成本纳入一个单一的能源竞标中。集中承诺系统中的系统运营商确保每台发电机都收回其两部分投标书中规定的启动和能源成本，而在自负市场中则不做任何此类保证。这些市场设计的能源成本排名和激励属性仍然是一个悬而未决的问题。尽管系统运营商可以通过集中的市场来确定最有效的调度，但是用于征求发电机数据的拍卖机制迫使发电机高估了成本。自我承诺可能涉及效率较低的调度，但具有更好的激励属性。我们在对称双头垄断的情况下得出两种市场设计的纳什均衡。我们还推导出了简单的条件，在该条件下，两个市场设计的成本预期相同。

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