Optimal Insurance Policy Indemnity Schedules With policyholders' limited liability and background Risk

Hofmann Annette; Haefen Ole V.; Nell Martin

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Optimal Insurance Policy Indemnity Schedules With policyholders' limited liability and background Risk

机译：具有保单持有人有限责任和背景风险的最佳保单赔偿计划

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This article makes two contributions to the insurance literature by studying optimal insurance policy indemnity schedules with policyholders' limited liability and background risk. First, generalizing a prominent approach by Huberman, Mayers, and Smith (1983), it is shown that a welfare subsidy in the case of a ruinous loss may make the insurance premium "overly fair" for nonbankrupting losses and full insurance for this event becomes optimal. Second, introducing correlated background risk into this limited liability framework relativizes or even turns results by Doherty and Schlesinger (1983) as to the impact of background risk on optimal coverage into its opposite.

机译：本文通过研究具有保单持有人有限责任和背景风险的最优保险单赔偿计划，对保险文献做出了两点贡献。首先，概括了Huberman，Mayers和Smith（1983）的一种突出方法，它表明在毁灭性损失的情况下提供的福利补贴可能使保险费对于非破产损失“过分公平”，因此该事件的全额保险成为最佳。其次，将相关的背景风险引入这个有限责任框架，可以使Doherty和Schlesinger（1983）将背景风险对最佳承保范围的影响相对化甚至反过来。

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《The journal of risk and insurance》 |2019年第4期|973-988|共16页
作者
Hofmann Annette; Haefen Ole V.; Nell Martin;
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St Johns Univ Peter J Tobin Coll Business Sch Risk Management Insurance & Actuarial Sci 101 Astor Pl New York NY 10003 USA;

Univ Hamburg Inst Risk & Insurance Von Melle Pk 5 D-20146 Hamburg Germany;

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Optimal Insurance Policy Indemnity Schedules With policyholders' limited liability and background Risk

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