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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Urban Economics >Airport capacity and congestion when carriers have market power
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Airport capacity and congestion when carriers have market power

机译：运营商有市场支配力时的机场容量和拥堵

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Several authors recently pointed out that congestion pricing has no (or only partial) place at an airport when carriers have market power, since carriers themselves will internalize congestion. This article investigates the impact of such self-internalization on the airport, as this would effectively deprive the airport of an important source of funds for its capacity investment. We find that airline market structure has no impact on airport capacity and congestion for a welfare-maximizing airport that receives public subsidy, while somewhat surprisingly, both a private airport and a budget-constrained public airport would tend to over-invest in capacity when carriers have market power.
机译：几位作者最近指出，在运营商具有市场支配力的情况下，机场的拥挤定价没有（或只有部分），因为运营商自己会内部化拥塞。本文研究了这种自我内在化对机场的影响，因为这将使机场丧失进行能力投资的重要资金来源。我们发现，航空公司市场结构对获得公共补贴的福利最大化的机场的容量和拥挤状况都没有影响，而令人惊讶的是，当承运人运营时，私人机场和预算紧张的公共机场都倾向于过度投资于容量有市场力量。

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