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On the endogenous allocation of decision powers in federal structures

机译：关于联邦机构中决策权的内生性分配

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This paper provides a political-economy explanation of the degree of centralization in economic policy making. To determine which policies are to be centralized, regions select representatives who then negotiate the degree of centralization and the regional cost shares of centrally decided policies. We show that the resulting degree of centralization is suboptimally low. Voters strategically delegate to representatives who are averse to public spending and hence prefer decentralized decisions in order to reduce their region's cost share. When spillovers are asymmetric, strategic delegation is stronger at the periphery than at the center.
机译：本文提供了经济决策集中度的政治经济学解释。为了确定要集中哪些策略，区域选择代表，然后由代表协商集中决策的集中度和区域成本份额。我们表明，最终的集中程度是次优的。选民从战略上委托给反对公共支出的代表，因此他们倾向于分散决策，以减少其地区的成本份额。当溢出不对称时，外围的战略授权要强于中心。

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