...
首页> 外文期刊>The Magazine for Environmental Managers >How the U.S. Supreme Court Could Dramatically Alter the Environmental Regulatory Landscape by Embracing the ‘Non-Delegation Doctrine’
【24h】

How the U.S. Supreme Court Could Dramatically Alter the Environmental Regulatory Landscape by Embracing the ‘Non-Delegation Doctrine’

机译:美国最高法院如何通过接受“非委托原则”来极大地改变环境监管格局

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           

摘要

Beginning with the confirmation of Justice Gorsuch tothe Supreme Court in early 2017, there has beenanticipation and/or concern that the court would bring anend to one of the cornerstone principles of administrativelaw known as “Chevron deference”. Since its landmarkdecision in Chevron U.S.A. v. NRDC (1984), the SupremeCourt has applied “Chevron deference” in instances wherea statute such as the U.S. Clean Air Act (CAA) is silent orvague on a particular issue. In such cases, Chevron permitsan agency such as the U.S. Environmental ProtectionAgency (EPA) to “fill in the blanks” utilizing the agency’sspecial technical expertise. As Congress lacks technicalexpertise in air pollution, for example, the heavy lifting ofmanaging air quality is not done by the Clean Air Act itself(the statute passed by Congress), but through the regulationsadopted by EPA under authority delegated to theagency by Congress.
机译:从戈尔苏奇大法官于2017年初向最高法院确认起,人们就开始预料和/或担心该法院将终结行政法的一项基本原则,即“雪佛龙尊重”。自从其在Chevron U.S.A.诉NRDC(1984)案中做出具有里程碑意义的裁决以来,最高法院在诸如《美国清洁空气法》(CAA)之类的法规对某个特定问题含糊其词的情况下适用“ Chevron deference”。在这种情况下,雪佛龙(Chevron)允许美国环境保护署(EPA)之类的代理商利用其特殊的技术专长“填补空白”。例如,由于国会在空气污染方面缺乏技术专长,管理空气质量的重任并不是《清洁空气法》本身(国会通过的法规),而是通过EPA在国会授权的机构授权下通过的法规。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号