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Reverse-LBOs, re-LBOs and informational asymmetry hypothesis of LBO transactions

机译：反向杠杆收购，反向杠杆收购和杠杆收购交易的信息不对称假设

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Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to examine the informational asymmetry (informational advantage of managers) in leveraged buyout (LBO) transactions.rnDesign/methodology/approach - Unlike previous studies of informational asymmetry in LBOs, this research uses a set of reverse-LBO and re-LBO firms. The paper proposes and empirically tests three hypotheses that draw on the informational advantage of managers in LBOs. Specifically, the value gain (VG) realized by the reverse-LBO firms is compared with that realized by a control sample of firms; the wealth distribution between managers and pre-buyout shareholders is studied; and, finally, the performance of re-LBO firms relative to reverse-LBO firms is evaluated. Findings - The results do not support the view that managers use buyouts to exploit their informational advantage. Specifically; the performance of LBO firms under the private ownership is comparable to those of matching public firms; the management team's return in a LBO deal is not significantly more than pre-buyout shareholders' return; and repeating reverse-LBO firms (re-LBOs) do not necessarily perform better than the non-repeating reverse-LBO firms. Originality/value - While reverse-LBOs have been investigated to some extent in the prior literature, studies on re-LBOs are quite scant - although these transactions offer a new and interesting avenue to examine the motivations behind LBOs in general. The use of the entire LBO - reverse-LBO - re-LBO cycle in testing the informational advantage of managers is a novelty. It is hoped that re-LBOs will attract the amount of attention they deserve as these firms may offer interesting means to reinvestigate commonly debated theories of corporate finance.
机译：目的-本文的目的是研究杠杆收购（LBO）交易中的信息不对称（管理者的信息优势）。rn设计/方法/方法-与先前有关LBO信息不对称的研究不同，本研究使用了一组反向杠杆收购和再杠杆收购公司。本文提出并实证检验了三个假设，这些假设利用了杠杆收购中管理者的信息优势。具体来说，将反向杠杆收购公司实现的价值增值与控制公司样本实现的增值进行比较。研究经理人与预购股东之间的财富分配；最后，对再杠杆收购公司相对于反向杠杆收购公司的绩效进行了评估。调查结果-结果不支持经理使用收购来利用其信息优势的观点。特别;私有制下的杠杆收购公司的业绩可与相匹配的上市公司媲美；管理团队通过杠杆收购交易获得的回报不超过收购前股东的回报；重复的反向LBO公司（re-LBOs）的表现不一定要比非重复的反向LBO公司好。原创性/价值-尽管在先前的文献中对反向LBO进行了一定程度的研究，但对重新LBO的研究却很少-尽管这些交易提供了一种新颖且有趣的途径来检查总体上LBO背后的动机。在测试管理者的信息优势时，使用整个LBO（反向LBO）-re-LBO循环是一种新颖。希望再杠杆收购将吸引他们应有的关注，因为这些公司可能会提供有趣的手段来重新研究备受争议的公司融资理论。

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