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Leasing, informational asymmetries and transaction cost economics: A theoretical and empirical investigation.

机译：租赁，信息不对称和交易成本经济学：理论和实证研究。

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摘要

Other than tax based arguments, the finance literature does not provide any widely accepted rationale for the existence of a lease as a unique or necessary contract. This paper offers an alternative explanation for its existence. We demonstrate that under conditions where firms (insiders) have more information than investors (outsiders), leasing offers investors an opportunity to monitor inexpensively the actions of the better informed insiders. Furthermore, we show that the decision to use an intermediating lessor is dependent on the type of assets being leased thereby introducing the ideas of asset specificity and the transaction cost economics (TCE) literature into the decision calculus.; For many years conventional wisdom surmised that leasing and debt (leverage) enjoyed a substitution-type relationship. In other words, the more debt a firm used in its capital structure, the less likely a firm would also employ leasing as a "financing" alternative. Yet, Ang and Peterson (1984) demonstrated that the empirical evidence indicated otherwise. In fact the two authors find that their analysis suggested that leasing and debt enjoyed a complementary relationship resulting in what they term a "leasing puzzle."; We argue that the surprising results of Ang and Peterson's study do not pose an enigma but follow an organizational pattern as predicated by Williamson (1988). As an empirical test of the TCE rationale, we reexamine the substitution problem in the field of leasing, focusing on the leverage/leasing issue and using the degree of asset specificity as an explicator. A proxy variable to measure suitably the "asset specificity" for a firm's asset portfolio is used to examine its relationship with the appropriate leasing and leverage ratios. For the majority of the years studied, the coefficient in question is found to be significant and negative. However, tests of the specific hypotheses provide inconclusive support for the asset specificity based theory used to explain the complementary relationship.
机译：除了基于税收的论点外，财务文献没有提供关于租赁作为唯一合同或必要合同的存在的任何被广泛接受的理由。本文为它的存在提供了另一种解释。我们证明，在公司（内部人）比投资者（外部人）拥有更多信息的情况下，租赁为投资者提供了机会，可以廉价地监视信息灵通的内部人的行为。此外，我们表明，使用中间出租人的决定取决于所租赁资产的类型，从而将资产专用性的思想和交易成本经济学（TCE）文献引入决策演算中。多年以来，传统观念一直认为租赁和债务（杠杆）具有替代类型的关系。换句话说，企业在其资本结构中使用的债务越多，企业使用租赁作为“融资”选择的可能性就越小。然而，昂格和彼得森（Ang and Peterson，1984）证明了经验证据并非如此。实际上，两位作者发现，他们的分析表明，租赁与债务之间存在互补关系，因此，他们称之为“租赁难题”。我们认为Ang和Peterson的研究的令人惊讶的结果不是造成谜，而是遵循Williamson（1988）所预言的组织模式。作为对传统文化表现形式理论基础的实证检验，我们重新审视了租赁领域的替代问题，重点是杠杆/租赁问题，并以资产专项程度作为解释者。代理变量用于适当地衡量公司资产组合的“资产专用性”，以检查其与适当的租赁和杠杆比率之间的关系。在研究的大部分年份中，发现相关系数显着且为负。但是，对特定假设的检验为基于资产特异性的理论提供了不确定的支持，该理论用于解释互补关系。

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  • 作者

    de la Torre, Cristobal.;

  • 作者单位

    The University of Texas at Austin.;

  • 授予单位 The University of Texas at Austin.;
  • 学科 Economics Finance.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 1990
  • 页码 156 p.
  • 总页数 156
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 财政、金融;
  • 关键词

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