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A game theoretical approach to competition between multi-user terminals: the impact of dedicated terminals

机译：多用户终端之间竞争的博弈论方法：专用终端的影响

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摘要

In response to globalization and structural changes in logistics, firms in the transport industry have re-evaluated the scope of their activities [1], A large number of shipping lines are vertically integrated to include terminal operations through shareholdings in or full ownership of dedicated terminal facilities. A number of terminal operating companies expanded their activities from their respective homeports to an international terminal network structure. These two developments have led to a competitive setting in which trans-national terminal operating companies and shipping lines vie for the control over terminal capacity. In this paper, a horizontal product differentiation model is introduced to analyze competition between container terminals using a game theoretic approach. We focus on a landlord port management system with long-term concessions agreements shaping the formal relationships between the Port Authority (PA) (who owns the land) and the private Terminal Operators (TOs) (who use the land for terminal activities). Starting from the linear city model of Hotelling [2], we develop a framework for Cournot competition between multi-user terminals. By comparing the results (expected payoffs for potential TOs and PAs) of different cases, this paper demonstrates how the shift toward a fully dedicated terminal impacts on intra-port and inter-port competition between the remaining multiuser terminals. The model is illustrated by referring to a case of terminal competition in a realistic setting.
机译：为了应对全球化和物流业的结构变化，运输行业的公司已经重新评估了其活动范围[1]。大量的航运公司被垂直整合，以通过拥有或完全拥有专用码头的所有权来包括码头业务。设备。许多终端运营公司将其活动从各自的母港扩展到了国际终端网络结构。这两个方面的发展导致了竞争环境，跨国码头运营公司和航运公司争相控制码头容量。本文引入了一种横向产品差异化模型，以博弈论的方法来分析集装箱码头之间的竞争。我们关注的是拥有长期特许权协议的房东港口管理系统，该协议塑造了港口管理局（PA）（拥有土地）和私人码头经营者（TO）（将土地用于码头活动）之间的正式关系。从Hotelling的线性城市模型[2]开始，我们为多用户终端之间的古诺竞争开发了一个框架。通过比较不同案例的结果（潜在的TO和PA的预期收益），本文证明了向专用终端的转变如何影响其余多用户终端之间的端口内和端口间竞争。通过参考现实环境中终端竞争的情况来说明该模型。

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  • 来源
    《Maritime policy and management》 |2011年第4期|p.395-414|共20页
  • 作者

    EVANGELIA N. KASELIMI; THEO E. NOTTEBOOM; BRUNO DE BORGER;

  • 作者单位

    Institute of Transport Maritime Management Antwerp (ITMMA),University of Antwerp, Kipdorp 59, 2000 Antwerp, Belgium;

    Institute of Transport Maritime Management Antwerp (ITMMA),University of Antwerp, Kipdorp 59, 2000 Antwerp, Belgium;

    Department of Economics, University of Antwerp, Prinsstraat 13,2000 Antwerp, Belgium;

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