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Pricing Decisions of a Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain under Uncertain Demand of Indirect Channel

机译：间接渠道需求不确定的双渠道闭环供应链定价决策

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摘要

The dual-channel closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) which is composed of one manufacturer and one retailer under uncertain demand of an indirect channel is constructed. In this paper, we establish three pricing models under decentralized decision making, namely, the Nash game between the manufacturer and the retailer, the manufacturer-Stackelberg game, and the retailer-Stackelberg game, to investigate pricing decisions of the CLSC in which the manufacturer uses the direct channel and indirect channel to sell products and entrusts the retailer to collect the used products. We numerically analyze the impact of customer acceptance of the direct channel (theta) on pricing decisions and excepted profits of the CLSC. The results show that when the variable theta changes in a certain range, the wholesale price, retail price, and expected profits of the retailer all decrease when theta increases, while the direct online sales price and manufacturer's expected profits in the retailer-Stackelberg game all increase when theta increases. However, the optimal recycling transfer price and optimal acquisition price of used product are unaffected by theta.
机译：构建了在间接渠道需求不确定的情况下，由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的双通道闭环供应链（CLSC）。在本文中，我们建立了分散决策下的三种定价模型，即制造商与零售商之间的Nash博弈，制造商-Stackelberg博弈和零售商-Stackelberg博弈，以研究CLSC的定价决策，其中制造商使用直接渠道和间接渠道销售产品，并委托零售商收集使用过的产品。我们用数字分析客户接受直接渠道（theta）对定价决策和CLSC例外利润的影响。结果表明，当变量θ在一定范围内变化时，随着θ的增加，零售商的批发价格，零售价格和预期利润都将下降，而零售商-Stackelberg博弈中的直接在线销售价格和制造商的预期利润都将下降。当θ增加时增加。但是，二手产品的最佳回收转移价格和最佳采购价格不受theta的影响。

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  • 来源
    《Mathematical Problems in Engineering》 |2016年第5期|6053510.1-6053510.13|共13页
  • 作者

    Gao Jie; Wang Xiong; Yang Qiuling; Zhong Qin;

  • 作者单位

    Sichuan Tourism Coll, Dept Business Adm, Chengdu 610100, Peoples R China|Tsinghua Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Beijing 100084, Peoples R China;

    Sichuan Tourism Coll, Dept Business Adm, Chengdu 610100, Peoples R China;

    Sichuan Tourism Coll, Dept Business Adm, Chengdu 610100, Peoples R China;

    Wuhan Inst Technol, Sch Management, Wuhan 430074, Peoples R China;

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