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Contracting Fashion Products Supply Chains When Demand Is Dependent on Price and Sales Effort

机译：当需求取决于价格和销售努力时，缔约时尚产品供应链

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摘要

This paper investigates optimal decisions in a two-stage fashion product supply chain under two specified contracts: revenue-sharing contract and wholesale price contract, where demand is dependent on retailing price and sales effort level. Optimal decisions and related profits are analyzed and further compared among the cases where the effort investment fee is determined and undertaken either by the retailer or the manufacturer. Results reveal that if the retailer determines the effort investment level, she would be better off under the wholesale price contract and would invest more effort. However, if the manufacturer determines the effort level, he prefers to the revenue-sharing contract most likely if both parties agree on consignment.
机译：本文研究了两个特定合同下的两阶段时尚产品供应链中的最优决策：收益共享合同和批发价格合同，其中需求取决于零售价格和销售努力水平。在零售商或制造商确定并承担努力投资费的情况下，将对最佳决策和相关利润进行分析和进一步比较。结果表明，如果零售商确定精力投入水平，根据批发价合同，她会更好，并且会投入更多的精力。但是，如果制造商确定工作量级别，则在双方都同意托运的情况下，他更愿意选择收益分成合同。

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  • 来源
    《Mathematical Problems in Engineering》 |2015年第5期|161486.1-161486.7|共7页
  • 作者

    Wei Ying; Xiong Liyang;

  • 作者单位

    Jinan Univ, Dept Business Adm, Sch Management, Guangzhou 510632, Guangdong, Peoples R China.;

    Jinan Univ, Dept Business Adm, Sch Management, Guangzhou 510632, Guangdong, Peoples R China.;

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