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Coordination Game Analysis through Penalty Scheme in Freight Intermodal Service

机译:货运联运服务中通过罚款计划进行的协调博弈分析

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摘要

We study coordination mechanisms through penalty schemes to cooperate the behavior of two firms as successive segment carriers to make transport plan separate in freight intermodal market. Based on the different cost structure and service level constraint to two firms, we compare the decision making in two possible decision systems, that is, centralized system and decentralized system. In a centralized system-the first best case as a benchmark is contrasted with decentralized system. In the decentralized system, a Stackelberg game model is formulated between two firms. Some discordant decisions would be made by firm Ⅰ's overestimate motivation and firm Ⅱ's undersupply motivation. Our primary objective is to design penalty schemes to coordinate the interactions for two firms. The study shows in a decentralized system, setting suitable penalty schemes can coordinate the two firms' decision. We also study the feasible range of penalty parameters, and some important managerial insights are then deduced. In the end, a numerical example is provided to verify the validity of results, some concluding remarks are presented subsequently.
机译:我们通过惩罚方案研究协调机制,以协调两家公司作为连续分段承运人的行为,以使货运联运市场中的运输计划分开。基于两家公司不同的成本结构和服务水平约束,我们比较了两种可能的决策系统,即集中式系统和分散式系统的决策。在集中式系统中,最好的基准情况是与分散式系统形成对比。在分散系统中,两家公司之间建立了Stackelberg博弈模型。公司Ⅰ的高估动机和公司Ⅱ的供应不足动机可能会导致一些不一致的决定。我们的主要目标是设计惩罚方案,以协调两家公司的互动。研究表明,在分散的系统中,设置合适的罚款方案可以协调两家公司的决策。我们还研究了惩罚参数的可行范围,然后推论出一些重要的管理见解。最后,提供了一个数值例子来验证结果的有效性,随后给出一些结论。

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  • 来源
    《Mathematical Problems in Engineering》 |2012年第8期|247509.1-247509.14|共14页
  • 作者单位

    School of Traffic and Transportation, Lanzhou Jiaotong University, Lanzhou 730070, China;

    School of Traffic and Transportation, Lanzhou Jiaotong University, Lanzhou 730070, China;

    School of Traffic and Transportation, Lanzhou Jiaotong University, Lanzhou 730070, China;

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