Captain America's Shield for ASEAN?

Dzirhan Mahadzir

摘要

As of October 2015, the US has announced it will conduct Freedom Of Navigation exercises in the South China Sea near China's reclamation features. While demonstrating that the US does not recognise China's claims of sovereignty over the South China Sea, the exercise, while demonstrating US resolve, will unlikely deter China. In any event, China's strategy for the South China Sea relies less on military coercion but instead on a combination of economics, politics, and coercion by legal enforcement in the South China Sea. Unfortunately, the US response, as has been the case in the Middle East and Afghanistan, is to trot out its military which tries to carry out a Captain America strategy of protecting its "weak and helpless partners" in the region. The problem with such a strategy is, first off, it buys nicely into China's domestic narrative that the US is seeking to constrain the rise of China and also seeks to coerce China via military means. For China, reclamation works and militarisation of its features is legitimate, since all other claimants have already done so. Thus, China is simply carrying on an accepted practice, plus the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has not been interfering with any nations' right of passage or activity in the area (though the various Chinese maritime enforcement agencies have), so the US military response is an example of US aggression towards China. While such a narrative is not going to gain credence in most places, Beijing knows that it will do so in the one place that counts, namely its own populace. The views of everyone else beyond that, in the eyes of China's leadership, is irrelevant, particularly when China's economic clout can buy off the political leadership of most of ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations). The US' approach allows ASEAN countries concerned with the Chinese presence in the South China Sea to basically outsource the security issue to the US, while maintaining their economic links to China. Of the four nations with contesting claims in the Spratly Islands (Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei), only Vietnam is seriously upgrading its military capabilities, though as it had done against the French, the U,S and South Vietnam in the Indochina wars, it has been in the manner of a quiet build up that allows it to surprise opponents who overlook it. Brunei's situation is understandable, given its tiny size and low manpower, but the Philippines and Malaysia have shown a clear lack of urgency in building up any serious military capabilities to deter China. Neither leadership in Manila or Kuala Lumpur looks to be stable or strong in the future, as the Philippines head to a presidential election in 2016 and Malaysian Prime Minister Dato' Seri Najib Tun Razak's premiership since 2013 seems to be a case of waiting for the other shoe to drop in regard to various crisis which preoccupy him (in 2013 it was an invasion by Sulu militants and a spate of kidnappings in East Malaysia; in 2014, the twin tragedies of MH370 and MH17, along with massive nationwide flood at the end of the year; and this year has been the 1MDB issue and Malaysia's faltering economy with a sideline of the SCORPENE submarine issue resurfacing again), which leaves the US in the regular position of propping up partners and allies, which are unable to help themselves. It should be noted that the US call for partners to participate in the Freedom of Navigation exercise has not met with any response from ASEAN, despite the supposedly ASEAN concern on China's activities though on the plus side. ASEAN nations have not yet responded positively to China's attempt to muddy the waters by calling for an maritime HADR exercise between China and ASEAN nations with Indonesia emphatically saying no to such an exercise. Fundamentally the US also is overlooking China's economic strength, the TTP may be a part of a US strategy to overcome such, but China's economic stranglehold lies in its support of infrastructure building in the region. The somewhat nebulous nature of regulation of infrastructure construction programmes in most ASEAN countries, which are often tied to political interests and connections and China's willingness to carry out such programmes with less rigid financial restrictions at the outset, allows China to exert influence on the political leadership of most ASEAN nations. The Maritime Silk Road initiative and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) further strengthen China's strength in such areas. The fundamental challenge for the US might be less in confronting China but instead confronting its ASEAN allies and partners on the fact that they need to do more for themselves rather than relying on Captain America's shield. Unfortunately, Iraq and Afghanistan illustrates that the US would rather allow its allies to hide behind it than seriously take steps to stand for themselves.

机译：截至2015年10月，美国宣布将在中国填海区附近的南中国海进行航行自由演习。尽管这表明美国不承认中国对南中国海的主权要求，但这一演习虽然表明了美国的决心，但不太可能阻止中国。无论如何，中国的南海战略较少依靠军事胁迫，而是依靠经济，政治和通过在南中国海进行执法的强制相结合。不幸的是，与中东和阿富汗一样，美国的反应是撤出其军事力量，该军事力量试图执行美国队长战略，以保护其在该地区的“软弱无助的伙伴”。这种战略的问题首先是，它很好地融入了中国的国内叙事中，美国正试图限制中国的崛起，并试图通过军事手段胁迫中国。对于中国来说，开垦工程及其功能军事化是合法的，因为所有其他索赔人都已经这样做了。因此，中国只是在进行一种公认的做法，而且中国人民解放军海军（PLAN）并未干涉任何国家在该地区的通行权或活动权（尽管中国海事执法机构对此有任何干涉），因此美国军事反应是美国侵略中国的一个例子。尽管这样的叙述在大多数地方都不会赢得信任，但北京知道它将在一个重要的地方，即其本国民众中获得信任。在中国领导人看来，除此之外，其他所有人的看法都是无关紧要的，特别是当中国的经济影响力可以买断大多数东盟（东南亚国家联盟）的政治领导权时。美国的做法允许关心中国在南中国海存在的东盟国家在维持与中国的经济联系的同时，将安全问题基本上外包给美国。在南沙群岛（越南，菲律宾，马来西亚和文莱）拥有主权的四个国家中，只有越南正在认真提高其军事能力，尽管它曾在印度支那对付法国，美国和越南南方战争中，它一直以安静的方式积累，使它使忽略它的对手感到惊讶。汶莱的规模很小，人手少，这种情况是可以理解的，但菲律宾和马来西亚显然缺乏建立任何严重的军事能力来威慑中国的紧迫性。马尼拉或吉隆坡的领导层未来都不会稳定或强大，因为菲律宾将于2016年举行总统大选，马来西亚首相拿督斯里纳吉（Nerib Tun Razak）自2013年以来的首相职位似乎是在等待对方由于各种危机使他陷入困境（2013年是苏禄武装分子的入侵和东马的一连串绑架; 2014年，MH370和MH17的双重悲剧，以及在年底末发生的全国性大洪水）一年；今年是1MDB问题和马来西亚步履蹒跚的经济，而SCORPENE潜艇问题再次浮出水面），这使美国处于扶持无法自救的伙伴和盟国的常规地位。应当指出，尽管据说东盟对中国的活动表示担忧，但美国方面对东盟对中国活动的关注尽管如此，但美国呼吁合作伙伴参加“航行自由”演习并未得到任何回应。东盟国家尚未对中国试图弄混水域的努力作出积极回应，呼吁中国与东盟国家之间进行海上HADR演习，印度尼西亚则坚决反对这种演习。美国从根本上也忽视了中国的经济实力，TTP可能是美国克服这一实力的战略的一部分，但中国的经济str锁在于其对该地区基础设施建设的支持。在大多数东盟国家，基础设施建设计划的监管性质有些模糊，通常与政治利益和联系联系在一起，而且中国愿意一开始就实施这些计划，而对财务的限制并不那么严格，这使得中国可以对政治领导施加影响大多数东盟国家。海上丝绸之路倡议和亚洲基础设施投资银行（AIIB）进一步加强了中国在这些领域的实力。美国面临的根本挑战可能不是与中国对抗，而是与东盟盟国和伙伴对抗，因为他们需要为自己做更多的事情，而不是依靠美国队长的盾牌。不幸的是，伊拉克和阿富汗表明，美国宁愿允许其盟友躲在其后方，也不愿认真采取措施站稳自己。

Captain America's Shield for ASEAN?

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