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首页> 外文期刊>Minds and Machines >It's Friendship, Jim, but Not as We Know It: A Degrees-of-Friendship View of Human-Robot Friendships
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It's Friendship, Jim, but Not as We Know It: A Degrees-of-Friendship View of Human-Robot Friendships

机译：这是友谊，吉姆，但不是我们所知道的：人类机器人友谊的友谊观

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摘要

This article argues in defence of human-robot friendship. I begin by outlining the standard Aristotelian view of friendship, according to which there are certain necessary conditions which x must meet in order to 'be a friend'. I explain how the current literature typically uses this Aristotelian view to object to human-robot friendships on theoretical and ethical grounds. Theoretically, a robot cannot be our friend because it cannot meet the requisite necessary conditions for friendship. Ethically, human-robot friendships are wrong because they are deceptive (the robot does not actually meet the conditions for being a friend), and could also make it more likely that we will favour 'perfect' robots, and disrespect, exploit, or exclude other human beings. To argue against the above position, I begin by outlining and assessing current attempts to reject the theoretical argument-that we cannot befriend robots. I argue that the current attempts are problematic, and do little to support the claim that we can be friends with robots now (rather than in some future time). I then use the standard Aristotelian view as a touchstone to develop a new degrees-of-friendship view. On my view, it is theoretically possible for humans to have some degree of friendship with social robots now. I explain how my view avoids ethical concerns about human-robot friendships being deceptive, and/or leading to the disrespect, exploitation, or exclusion of other human beings.
机译：本文争辩捍卫人类机器人的友谊。我首先概述了友谊的标准aristotelian视图，根据哪些必要条件，X必须以“成为朋友”。我解释了当前的文献如何通常使用这个aristotelian视图来对象对理论和道德地面的人机友谊。从理论上讲，机器人不能成为我们的朋友，因为它不能满足友谊的必要条件。道德上，人机友谊是错误的，因为它们是欺骗性的其他人。为了反对上述立场，我首先概述和评估当前的尝试拒绝理论论点 - 我们不能成为机器人。我认为目前的尝试是有问题的，并且很少能够支持我们现在可以成为机器人的声称（而不是在一些未来时间）。然后，我使用标准的aristotelian视图作为一种香气石来开发新的友谊视图。在我看来，人类现在可以理解，现在可以与社会机器人有一定程度的友谊。我解释了我的观点如何避免对人机友谊的欺骗性的伦理问题，和/或导致其他人的不尊重，剥削或排除。

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