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Indirect information exchange

机译:间接信息交流

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摘要

The goal of this paper is to show that when agents can engage in second-hand trading of information, some agents may not be able to exchange their information with other agents. With three agents, such foreclosure is possible only when agents can refuse to exchange information. With four or more players, foreclosure is possible even when players cannot abstain from or refuse to trade, but it does not constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium. Players can avoid being foreclosed by choosing what to trade and with whom. The results can be applied to formal and informal information sharing, file sharing systems and peer-to-peer networks.
机译:本文的目的是表明,当代理商可以进行二手信息交易时,某些代理商可能无法与其他代理商交换信息。对于三个代理,仅当代理可以拒绝交换信息时,这种取消抵押品赎回权才是可能的。如果有四个或更多的玩家,即使玩家不能放弃或拒绝交易,也可以取消抵押品赎回权,但它不能构成子游戏的完美平衡。玩家可以选择与谁交易以及与谁交易,从而避免被赎回。结果可以应用于正式和非正式的信息共享,文件共享系统以及对等网络。

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