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首页> 外文期刊>The North American journal of economics and finance >Indirect taxation and consumer welfare in an asymmetric Stackelberg oligopoly
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Indirect taxation and consumer welfare in an asymmetric Stackelberg oligopoly

机译：非对称Stackelberg寡头垄断中的间接税收和消费者福利

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摘要

This paper studies undesirable competition in an asymmetric Stackelberg oligopoly under both unit and ad valorem taxation. We find that (i) under unit taxation, a rise in the number of inefficient followers hurts consumers, but the harm to consumer welfare is less severe than that under Cournot competition; (ii) under ad valorem taxation, in addition to the entry of inefficient followers, a rise in the number of efficient leaders may also hurt consumers. The harm to consumer welfare could be more severe than that under Cournot competition when the cost difference between leaders and followers is large; (iii) unit taxation yields higher consumer welfare in comparison to ad valorem taxation. Our result is important for competition policy.
机译：本文研究了从量税和从价税下不对称Stackelberg寡头竞争中的不良竞争。我们发现：（i）在单位税制下，效率低下的追随者数量的增加伤害了消费者，但对消费者福利的危害不如古诺竞争下的严重； （ii）在从价税项下，除了低效的追随者入境之外，高效率的领导人人数的增加也可能损害消费者。当领导者和追随者之间的成本差异很大时，对消费者福利的危害可能比在古诺竞争下更为严重。 （iii）与从价税相比，单位税产生更高的消费者福利。我们的结果对于竞争政策很重要。

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