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Development of bank microcredit

机译:制定银行小额信贷

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摘要

We analyze the process by which banks enter the microcredit market while still engaging in traditional credit practices. For this we study a competitive credit market with adverse selection, where lenders are endowed with a screening technology capable of extracting an informative signal about a borrower's quality if enough time is devoted to process the loan application. The time necessary for signal extraction depends on the borrower's informational transparency. In the presence of opaque and transparent borrowers, depending on economy parameters, either a separating equilibrium with standard credit or microcredit prevails or a pooling equilibrium with either loan contract prevails.
机译:我们分析银行进入小额信贷市场的过程,同时仍然从事传统信贷实践。为此,我们研究竞争信贷市场与逆向选择,贷款人赋予筛选技术,如果足够的时间致力于处理贷款申请,则能够提取关于借款人的质量的信息性能。信号提取所需的时间取决于借款人的信息透明度。在不透明和透明的借款人的存在下,根据经济参数,与标准信用或微量密封的分离均衡占占贷款合同的汇总均衡或汇集均衡。

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