• 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文期刊>The North American journal of economics and finance >How CEO narcissism affects earnings management behaviors
【24h】

How CEO narcissism affects earnings management behaviors

机译：CEO自恋如何影响收入管理行为

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

This study examined whether chief executive officers' (CEOs) with narcissistic tendencies are more likely to execute earnings management behavior because of pressure to fulfill earnings thresholds. The results revealed that a CEO who exhibits high narcissism is more likely to be involved in earnings management to compensate for her/his performance. Our findings suggest that CEO narcissism directly influences financial decisions. Considering the earnings thresholds, firms with a more narcissistic CEO experience a regulatory effect on real earnings management behavior. Studies have indicated that CEOs manipulate earnings to satisfy three primary earnings thresholds: prior year's reported earnings, zero earnings, and analysts' forecasts. Our empirical results provide further evidence that CEOs engage in earnings management to fulfill positive earnings thresholds and analysts' forecasts. We infer that CEOs use the abnormal production cost method as an underlying mechanism to increase reported earnings. Our findings help clarify the relationship between CEO personality traits and earnings manipulation to assist investors with decision-making.
机译：本研究审查了由于履行收益门槛的压力，审查了行政长官（首席执行官）是否更有可能执行收益管理行为。结果表明，展现出高自恋的首席执行官更有可能参与盈利管理，以弥补她/他的表现。我们的研究结果表明，首席执行官自恋直接影响财务决策。考虑到收益门槛，拥有更加自恋的CEO的公司对实际盈利管理行为的监管效果。研究表明，首席执行官操纵收益以满足三个主要盈利门槛：前一年报告的盈利，零收入和分析师预测。我们的经验结果提供了进一步证明CEO参与盈利管理，以满足积极的盈利门槛和分析师预测。我们推出首席执行官使用异常的生产成本法作为增加报告收益的潜在机制。我们的研究结果有助于澄清首席执行官人格特质与盈利操纵之间的关系，以协助投资者决策。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号