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Institutional monitoring, coordination and corporate acquisitions in China

机译：中国的机构监测，协调和企业收购

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摘要

Within the context of corporate acquisition decisions of China's Publicly Listed Corporations (PLCs), this paper investigates the monitoring and coordination behaviour of institutional shareholders. Institutional shareholders are divided into four groups: large outsider, large insider, small outsider and small insider. The outsider and insider categorization, respectively, represents the absence of significant business links with relevant PLCs. In China, institutional shareholders tend to either monitor the acquisitions decisions of PLCs or coordinate their response with the controlling shareholders (coordination in the present context amounts to cooperation). Using micro data from China's stock market over the 2003-2008 period, we find that (through ex-ante coordination with the controlling shareholders) the insider institutional investment tends to increase the likelihood of PLC acquisitions. However, through ex-ante monitoring of the PLC acquisition offers, the outsider institutional investment tends to decrease the acquisition likelihood. We find that, through ex-post monitoring of PLC acquisitions, institutional investors with large shareholdings can help improve the post-acquisition performance of Chinese PLCs. On the other hand, institutional investors with small shareholdings tend to coordinate their actions with the controlling shareholders. Accordingly, small institutional shareholders cannot affect the postacquisition performance of China's PLCs. Finally, we find that the so-called 'cherry-picking effect' exists only in the case of large outsider institutional investors.
机译：在中国公开上市公司（PLCS）的公司收购决定的背景下，本文调查了机构股东的监测和协调行为。机构股东分为四组：大型局外人，大型内幕，小型外商和小内幕。局外人和内幕分类分别代表了没有相关PLC的重要业务链接。在中国，机构股东倾向于监测PLC的收购决定或协调其对控股股东的答复（本文中的协调金额为合作）。在2003 - 2008年期间，使用来自中国股市的微量数据，我们发现（通过与控股股东的前对手协调）内幕机构投资往往会增加PLC收购的可能性。然而，通过对PLC收购优惠的前对手监测，局外机构投资往往会降低收购可能性。我们发现，通过对PLC收购的前后监测，大持有的机构投资者可以帮助改善中国PLC的收购售后表现。另一方面，具有小股权的机构投资者倾向于与控股股东协调其行动。因此，小型机构股东不得影响中国普尔的第一次行动绩效。最后，我们发现所谓的“樱桃采摘效果”只存在于大型局外机构投资者的情况下。

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  • 来源
    《The North American journal of economics and finance》 |2020年第1期|100835.1-100835.16|共16页
  • 作者

    Peng Fei; Anwar Sajid; Kang Lili;

  • 作者单位

    Shanghai Lixin Univ Accounting & Finance Dept Econ 2800 Wenxiang Rd Shanghai 201620 Peoples R China|Birmingham Business Sch CREW Univ House Edgbaston Pk Rd Birmingham B15 2TY W Midlands England;

    Univ Sunshine Coast USC Business Sch Maroochydore Qld 4558 Australia|Shanghai Lixin Univ Accounting & Finance Sch Int Econ & Trade Pudong New Area Shanghai 201209 Peoples R China;

    Shanghai Lixin Univ Accounting & Finance Sch Business Adm 995 Shangchuan Rd Shanghai 201209 Peoples R China;

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  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

    Institutional investment; Acquisition decisions; Institutional monitoring; Coordination; China;

    机译：机构投资;收购决策;机构监测;协调;中国;

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