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What Restoration Schemes Can Do? Or, Getting It Right Without Fisheries Transferable Quotas

机译：可以采取哪些恢复方案？或者，在没有渔业可转让配额的情况下解决问题

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摘要

Under the Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) schemes, the economic calculations fail to reflect a just distribution of wealth and results in deprivation of the public trust of fisheries. Some "neoclassic" economists claim that ITQs cost-efficiently eliminate the tragedy of the commons. However, Norwegian cost-benefit studies indicate a financial loss for second-generation ITQ owners due to the high price of tradable quotas. The financial burden caused by ITQs creates overfishing and pressure on the fishing stocks, which puts coastal municipalities at risk. If future fisheries are given legal protection, the losses due to hazardous fishing or overexploiting stocks is the fisherman's liability. Restoration schemes within the framework of total allowable catch (TAC) are an alternative to ITQs that may prevent resource depletion and the "tragedy of the commons."
机译：根据个人可转让配额（ITQ）计划，经济计算无法反映财富的公平分配，并导致剥夺了公众对渔业的信任。一些“新古典主义”经济学家声称，ITQ可以经济高效地消除公地悲剧。但是，挪威的成本效益研究表明，由于可交易配额的高昂价格，第二代ITQ所有者遭受了财务损失。 ITQs造成的财务负担使过度捕捞和捕捞种群承受压力，使沿海城市面临风险。如果将来的渔业受到法律保护，则由于危险捕鱼或过度捕捞种群而造成的损失是渔民的责任。在总允许捕获量（TAC）框架内的恢复方案是ITQ的替代方案，可以防止资源枯竭和“公地悲剧”。

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