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首页> 外文期刊>Ocean Development & International Law >Comment on 'What Restoration Schemes Can Do. Or, Getting It Right Without Fisheries Transferable Quotas'
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Comment on 'What Restoration Schemes Can Do. Or, Getting It Right Without Fisheries Transferable Quotas'

机译：评论“恢复计划可以做什么。或者，在没有渔业可转让配额的情况下解决问题

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The recently published paper by Peter Orebech (2005) in this journal uses secondary sources, and primarily a paper by Grafton, Squires, and Fox (2000), to claim that the high price for individual transferable quotas (ITQs) in fisheries creates a financial burden on new entrants that leads to illegal fishing and excessive pressure on stocks. We refute much of what is claimed by Orebech (2005) using the very same sources. The central tenets of Orebech's argument are that: (1) ITQs are akin to a "robbery" (Orebech, p. 166) and "privatize" what was once a resource open to all, thereby bene-fitting the initial quota holders that receive the individual harvesting rights gratis. (2) The enclosure of the commons with ITQs forces some fishers to exit, which then allows the lucky few who remain to enjoy increased profits. These returns are then removed from traditional fishing communities and are "part of a gigantic project of moving resource rents from the coast and into global financial centers" (Orebech, p. 170). (3) The increased investment costs associated with purchasing ITQs negate any benefits of individual harvesting rights and result in "illegal fishing and excessive pressure on fish stocks" (Orebech, p. 167), and (4) with ITQs "no economic efficiency gains were measured" (Orebech, p. 167) and the claim by Grafton, Squires, and Fox that ITQs are superior to traditional methods "is without valid foundation" (Orebech, p. 171). All of these claims are refuted below.
机译：Peter Orebech（2005）最近在该期刊上发表的论文使用了二级资源，主要是Grafton，Squires和Fox（2000）的论文，声称渔业中个人可转让配额（ITQ）的高价创造了经济利益。新进入者的负担，导致非法捕捞和种群过度压力。我们使用相同的资料反驳了Orebech（2005）所说的大部分内容。 Orebech的论点的中心思想是：（1）ITQ类似于“抢劫”（Orebech，第166页），并将曾经对所有人开放的资源“私有化”，从而使最初获得配额的人受益个人收割权免费提供。 （2）与ITQ围在一起的公地迫使一些渔民退出，从而使幸存的少数幸运者享有增加的利润。这些收益然后从传统的捕鱼社区中移走，并且是“将资源租金从沿海地区转移到全球金融中心的一项巨大工程的一部分”（Orebech，第170页）。 （3）购买ITQ所带来的增加的投资成本抵消了个人捕捞权的任何利益，并导致“非法捕鱼和鱼类种群承受过度压力”（Orebech，p。167），以及（4）ITQ所带来的“没有经济效率收益”测量”（Orebech，第167页），而Grafton，Squires和Fox声称ITQ优于传统方法“是没有有效依据的”（Orebech，第171页）。以下驳斥所有这些主张。

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