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Editorial Canada Ratifies the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: At Last

机译：加拿大社论批准1982年《联合国海洋法公约：最后

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Identifying the benefits of Canadian ratification of the LOS Convention in 2003 is a challenge. All of the jurisdictional entitlements (territorial sea, 200 n.m. zone, jurisdiction over the shelf beyond 200 n.m., special provisions for vessels in the Arctic) have been exercised by Canada without international challenge for years. Canada's nonparty status has not inhibited Canada in pursuing its oceans interests, and generally, those parts of the LOS Convention of immediate concern are easily and reasonably claimable as being part of customary international law. From a strictly "benefits" point of view, the case for ratification in 1982 could be made, but this case has faded over time. Identifying the costs of Canadian ratification in 2003 is easier. There is the financial burden of contributions to the LOS Convention institutions. With Canada now obliged to follow the Article 76 outer limit procedures (although even as a nonparty, this would have been difficult to avoid), there are costs in undertaking the scientific research of the adjacent continental margin in order to solidify and maximize Canada's continental shelf claim beyond 200 n.m. There are the potential costs regarding the Article 82 revenue-sharing should mineral resources be exploited from the shelf beyond 200 n.m., although again it can be questioned how politically possible it would have been to avoid these contributions as a nonparty. While it can be argued that ratification of the LOS Convention forecloses the option any time soon of unilaterally extending exclusive Canadian fisheries control beyond 200 n.m. onto the nose and tail of the Grand Banks (or to be congruent with Canada's continental shelf outer limit), the reality is that Canada's ratification of the UNFA in August 1999 and the UNFA's entry into force in December 2001 essentially removed that opportunity in the short term. The 1995 UNFA explicitly recognizes that exclusive national fisheries jurisdiction ends at 200 n.m. and international authority exercised through regional fisheries management organizations, such as the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO), exists beyond 200 n.m. Without an international tidal wave, such as occurred with the introduction of the 200 n. mile fishing zones in the 1970s, to fundamentally re-structure global fisheries management and extent national jurisdiction over fisheries, the 200 n.m. limit will remain as the boundary of exclusive national authority over marine living resources. Regarding many of the ocean issues on Canada's radar screen today―flag of convenience fishing vessels operating adjacent to Canadian waters; operational vessel-source pollution within Canada's 200 n.m. zones, maritime boundary and transboundary fisheries and pollution relations with the United States, combating potential terrorism at sea―the LOS Convention, while relevant and important, is not necessarily directly helpful. Ultimately, the case in favor of Canadian ratification of the LOS Convention was based on foreign policy and closure. Canada invested so much talent (Alan Beesley, Leonard Legault, Bob Applebaum, Richard Haworth, Paul Lapointe, Robert Hage, and the list goes on), energy, resources, and time in the creation of the LOS Convention, the constitution of the oceans. The negotiating goals for the law of the sea conference set out in the 1973 "blue book" were almost all met or exceeded. Over 140 other states had faced the same concerns as Canada and had decided to become parties to the Treaty. Canadian participation―having a voice―in the institutions of the LOS Convention, in particular, the CLCS, the meeting of the state parties (SPLOS), and as regards any invocation of Article 312 and a review conference, was important. While the LOS Convention does not solve Canada's immediate ocean concerns and the real and potential costs were duly pointed out, the broader perspective prevailed. The LOS Convention, to which Canada contributed so much and through which Canada a
机译：确定加拿大在2003年批准《 LOS公约》的好处是一项挑战。加拿大行使了所有管辖权（领海，200海里区，超过200海里的架子管辖权，对北极地区船只的特殊规定），多年来没有受到国际挑战。加拿大的非政党地位并没有妨碍加拿大追求其海洋利益，一般来说，《 LOS公约》中与之直接相关的那些部分可以作为习惯国际法的一部分轻松而合理地主张。从严格的“好处”的角度来看，可以提出1982年批准的理由，但是随着时间的流逝，这种情况逐渐消失。确定2003年加拿大批准书的费用比较容易。向《 LOS公约》各机构捐款的财务负担很大。由于加拿大现在必须遵守第76条的外部界限程序（尽管即使是非缔约国，这也很难避免），为了巩固和最大化加拿大的大陆架，进行相邻大陆边缘的科学研究是有成本的声称超过200海里如果从200 m.m.以后的架子上开采矿产资源，则第82条收益分享可能会产生成本，尽管再次有人质疑，避免以非党派的方式进行捐助在政治上有多大的可能性。可以争辩说，批准《 LOS公约》会在不久的将来取消将加拿大的专属渔业控制权单方面扩大到200海里的选择。在大银行的鼻子和尾巴上（或与加拿大的大陆架外部界限保持一致），现实是加拿大于1999年8月批准了联合国部队，而联合国部队于2001年12月生效实际上在短时间内消除了这一机会。术语。 1995年联合国粮食和农业组织明确承认国家渔业专有管辖权在200下午结束。通过区域渔业管理组织（例如西北大西洋渔业组织（NAFO））行使的国际权威已超过200海里。没有国际潮流，例如200 n的引入。在1970年代英里捕鱼区，从根本上重组了全球渔业管理，并扩大了国家对渔业的管辖权，即200海里。限制将仍然是海洋生物资源国家专属权威的界限。关于今天加拿大雷达屏幕上的许多海洋问题，即在加拿大水域附近作业的便利渔船的旗帜；加拿大200海里以内的可操作的船源污染区域，海上边界和跨界渔业以及与美国的污染关系，打击潜在的海上恐怖主义-《 LOS公约》虽然相关且重要，但不一定直接有帮助。最终，赞成加拿大批准《 LOS公约》的案件是基于外交政策和关闭。加拿大在建立LOS公约，建立海洋方面投入了大量的精力（艾伦·比斯利，伦纳德·勒戈特，鲍勃·苹果鲍姆，理查德·海沃斯，保罗·拉波因特，罗伯特·哈奇，清单还在继续） 。 1973年“蓝皮书”中规定的海洋法会议的谈判目标几乎全部达到或超过了。其他140多个州也面临与加拿大相同的关注，并决定加入该条约。重要的是，加拿大必须参与《 LOS公约》的机构，尤其是CLCS的机构，缔约国会议（SPLOS），以及对第312条的任何援引和审议会议。尽管《 LOS公约》不能解决加拿大的直接海洋关切，并适当指出了实际和潜在的成本，但普遍存在着更大的前景。 LOS公约，加拿大为此做出了巨大贡献，加拿大通过

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