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首页> 外文期刊>Organization science >The Liability of Good Reputation: A Study of Product Recalls in the U.S. Automobile Industry
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The Liability of Good Reputation: A Study of Product Recalls in the U.S. Automobile Industry

机译：良好声誉的责任：美国汽车行业的产品召回研究

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In this paper, we explore opposing theoretical claims about how organizational reputation affects market reactions to product defects. On the one hand, good reputation could be a disadvantage because expectations about product quality are more likely to be violated by defects in highly reputed products. On the other hand, a good reputation could be an advantage because of strong inertial effects on reputation orderings. We empirically test these competing hypotheses using data on product recalls in the U.S. automobile industry from 1975 to 1999, Our results support for the idea that reputation can be an organizational liability in that highly reputed firms suffer more market penalty as a result of their product recalls. We also propose that the reputational effects are moderated by two important factors: substitutability and generalism/specialism. Our results show that having few substitutes with an equivalent level of reputation, or a focused product identity stemming from specialism, buffers the negative market reactions to product recalls. We conclude with a discussion on the implications of these results for institutional, reputation, and status theories.
机译：在本文中，我们探讨了有关组织声誉如何影响市场对产品缺陷的反应的相反理论主张。一方面，良好的声誉可能是不利的，因为对声誉卓著的产品的缺陷更有可能违反对产品质量的期望。另一方面，良好的信誉可能是优势，因为对信誉顺序的惯性影响很大。我们使用1975年至1999年美国汽车行业产品召回数据对这些竞争假设进行实证检验。我们的结果支持以下观点：声誉可能是组织的责任，因为声誉卓著的公司因其产品召回而遭受更多的市场惩罚。我们还建议，声誉影响应通过两个重要因素来缓和：可替代性和普遍主义/专业主义。我们的结果表明，很少有具有同等声誉水平的替代品，或源于专业知识的重点产品标识，可以缓解市场对产品召回的负面反应。最后，我们讨论了这些结果对制度，声誉和地位理论的影响。

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