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Prices vs quantities for international environmental agreements

机译：国际环境协议的价格与数量

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摘要

Does the choice between price-based or quantity-based regulation matter for the formation of an international environmental agreement (IEA)? We introduce abatement cost uncertainty in a standard coalition formation model and let countries choose their preferred regulatory instrument. It is shown that a coalition of cooperating countries is more likely to prefer a quantity regulation than non-cooperating countries. However, uncertainty also aggravates free-riding whenever the endogenous preference of the coalition is to implement quantities, which implies lower equilibrium participation than in the benchmark case without uncertainty. A restriction to price-based agreements can lead to higher participation, but does not necessarily raise global welfare. Tradable quantities can both increase participation in the agreement and achieve higher global welfare. Overall, our results suggest that free-riding incentives in global public good problems with uncertainty may be underestimated if the strategic implications of instrument choice are ignored.
机译：在基于价格的监管还是基于数量的监管之间进行选择对形成国际环境协议（IEA）至关重要吗？我们在标准联盟形成模型中引入减排成本的不确定性，并让各国选择其首选的监管工具。结果表明，合作国家联盟比非合作国家更倾向于数量管制。但是，每当联盟的内生偏好实现数量时，不确定性也会加剧搭便车，这意味着均衡参与比没有不确定性的基准情况低。对基于价格的协议的限制可能导致更高的参与度，但不一定会提高全球福利。可交易的数量既可以增加对协议的参与，也可以实现更高的全球福利。总体而言，我们的结果表明，如果忽略工具选择的战略含义，则可能会低估具有不确定性的全球公共利益问题中的搭便车激励。

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  • 来源
    《Oxford Economic Papers》 |2018年第4期|1084-1107|共24页
  • 作者

    Ulrike Kornek; Robert Marschinski;

  • 作者单位

    Mercator Research Institute on Global Commons and Climate Change, EUREF Campus 19, 10829 Berlin, Germany, Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, and Department of Economics of Climate Change, Technische Universitat Berlin;

    Joint Research Center, European Commission, Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, and Department of Economics of Climate Change, Technische Universitat Berlin;

  • 收录信息 美国《科学引文索引》(SCI);
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
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