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Pension reforms in France: the role of trade unions and the timing of the electoral cycle

机译：法国的养老金改革：工会的作用和选举周期的时间安排

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摘要

The French political system tends to produce strong governments backed by stable majorities in parliament. Despite this, even governments with a large parliamentary majority have been reluctant to reform the pension system. This article argues that the degree of difficulty in passing pension legislation depends on the mobilization capacity of trade unions and on the timing of the electoral cycle. First, this article tries to demonstrate how trade unions matter in France and under what conditions they might cause governments to abstain from making welfare cuts. Second, it is argued that focusing solely on the veto power of trade unions appears implausible, since during the 2003 pension reform process the government ignored union protests. Hence it is further argued that a further critical variable needs to be investigated - the timing of the electoral cycle. It is therefore anticipated that governments will be more successful in passing legislation that implements unpopular reforms in the first two and a half years of a legislative period.
机译：法国的政治体系倾向于在议会稳定多数的支持下建立强大的政府。尽管如此，即使议会占多数的政府也不愿改革养老金制度。本文认为，通过养老金立法的难易程度取决于工会的动员能力以及选举周期的时间。首先，本文试图证明工会在法国的重要性，以及在何种条件下工会可能导致政府放弃福利削减。其次，有人认为，仅关注工会的否决权似乎是不现实的，因为在2003年养老金改革过程中，政府无视工会的抗议活动。因此，有人进一步争辩说，还需要研究另一个关键变量-选举周期的时间安排。因此，可以预期，政府将在通过立法的前两年半内实施不受欢迎的改革的立法方面取得更大的成功。

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