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An Experimental Investigation of Procurement Auctions with Asymmetric Sellers

机译：不对称卖方采购拍卖的实验研究

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摘要

Electronic reverse auctions are a commonly used procurement mechanism. Research to date has focused on suppliers who are ex ante symmetric in that their costs are drawn from a common distribution. However, in many cases, a seller's range of potential costs depends on their own operations, location, or economies of scale and scope. Thus, understanding how different bidder types impact auction outcomes is key when designing an auction. This study reports the results of the first controlled laboratory experiment designed to compare prices between first-price and second-price procurement auctions for homogeneous goods when seller cost types are asymmetric and the number of bidders varies. The results indicate that first-price auctions generate lower prices regardless of market composition. The results also reveal that first-price auctions are at least weakly more efficient than second-price auctions despite the theoretical prediction that the reverse should hold in asymmetric auctions. Post hoc analysis of individual bidders' behavior in first-price auctions revealed evidence that bidders systematically underbid when their cost realizations were close to the lower bound. Furthermore, bidders adjust their behavior based on the type of the other bidders in the market in a manner inconsistent with theory. Consequently, adding a third bidder to a two-bidder market is not advantageous to the buyer unless that third bidder is a low-cost type.
机译：电子逆向拍卖是一种常用的采购机制。迄今为止，研究集中在事前对称的供应商，因为它们的成本来自共同的分配。但是，在许多情况下，卖方的潜在成本范围取决于他们自己的运营，所在地或规模经济和范围经济。因此，在设计拍卖时，了解不同投标人类型如何影响拍卖结果至关重要。本研究报告了第一个受控实验室实验的结果，该实验旨在比较当卖方成本类型不对称且投标人数量变化时，同质商品在第一价格采购拍卖和第二价格采购拍卖之间的价格。结果表明，不论市场构成如何，一价拍卖都会产生较低的价格。研究结果还表明，尽管理论上预测在非对称拍卖中应该相反，但第一价拍卖的效率至少比第二价拍卖弱。对首次竞标中个别竞标者行为的事后分析显示，有证据表明，当竞标者的成本实现接近下限时，他们会系统地竞标。此外，投标人以与理论不一致的方式根据市场上其他投标人的类型调整其行为。因此，除非出价第三者是低成本类型，否则将第三出价者添加到两价竞标的市场上对买方不利。

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  • 来源
    《Production and operations management》 |2016年第10期|1763-1777|共15页
  • 作者

    Aloysius John; Deck Cary; Hao Li; French Ryan;

  • 作者单位

    Univ Arkansas, Supply Chain Management Dept, 475 Walton Coll Business, Fayetteville, AR 72701 USA;

    Univ Arkansas, Dept Econ, 425 Walton Coll Business, Fayetteville, AR 72701 USA|Univ Alaska Anchorage, Dept Econ, Anchorage, AK 99508 USA|Chapman Univ, Econ Sci Inst, Orange, CA 92866 USA;

    Univ Arkansas, Dept Econ, 425 Walton Coll Business, Fayetteville, AR 72701 USA;

    Chapman Univ, Econ Sci Inst, Orange, CA 92866 USA;

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  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

    procurement; reverse auction; asymmetric auctions; laboratory experiment;

    机译：采购;反向拍卖;不对称拍卖;实验室实验;

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