...
  • 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文期刊>Production and operations management >Blending Capacity on a Rideshare Platform: Independent and Dedicated Drivers
【24h】

Blending Capacity on a Rideshare Platform: Independent and Dedicated Drivers

机译：在Rideshare平台上混合容量：独立和专用驱动程序

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

A rideshare platform acts as an aggregator that connects riders with ride providers (drivers). The drivers are independent workers who share a part of their revenue with the principal, who owns the platform. While drivers have flexible schedules, the fairness of labor contracts and control exercised by the principal have come into question lately. Suggested options include treating the drivers as employees and/or safeguarding a minimum income for them. We study a rideshare platform with blended driver capacity: full time employees with a fixed wage rate, and independent drivers who are paid a share of revenue. We examine a scenario where the principal establishes the number of employee drivers, revenue sharing, and a base price for the platform; and the independent drivers then determine whether to join the platform. We identify economic equilibrium for two different demand rationing strategies: preference for employee drivers, and equal opportunity for all drivers (driver-agnostic). We find that a blended platform capacity becomes viable if the wage rate is moderate, pool of independent drivers is large, and the ride-seeker market is large. We show that the unpredictability of driver's reservation value motivates the principal to hire more employee drivers and to increase the base price. Our result that a driver-agnostic demand rationing causes fewer independent drivers to join the platform is somewhat counterintuitive and is explained by how revenue sharing affects demand rationing. We find that the ride seekers prefer preferential demand rationing over driver-agnostic rationing.
机译：Rideshare平台充当聚合器，用于将骑手与乘坐提供商（驱动程序）连接。司机是独立工人，他们与拥有该平台的校长分享其收入的一部分。虽然司机有灵活的时间表，但委托人行使的劳动合同和控制的公平最近遭到了疑问。建议的选项包括将司机视为员工和/或维护他们的最低收入。我们使用混合驾驶员的骑士平台进行研究：全职员工，具有固定工资的员工，以及支付收入份额的独立驱动因素。我们研究了校长建立员工司机，收入分享和平台基本价格的方案;然后，独立的驱动程序确定是否加入平台。我们确定两种不同需求配给策略的经济均衡：员工司机的偏好，以及所有司机的平等机会（驱动程序 - 不可知论者）。如果工资率适中，独立驾驶员池很大，乘车市场大幅，我们发现混合平台容量变得可行。我们表明，驾驶员的预订价值的不可预测性激励校长雇用更多员工驱动因素并增加基本价格。我们的结果，驾驶员无神不可话的需求配给导致更少的独立驱动程序加入平台，这是一个违反直觉的，并通过收入分担如何影响需求配给来解释。我们发现乘坐寻求者更喜欢优先需求对驾驶员无关的配给。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号