...
  • 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文期刊>Production and operations management >Optimal Subsidy Schemes and Budget Allocations for Government-Subsidized Trade-in Programs
【24h】

Optimal Subsidy Schemes and Budget Allocations for Government-Subsidized Trade-in Programs

机译：政府补贴贸易方案的最佳补贴计划和预算分配

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

Applications of government subsidies to speed up consumer trade-ins of used products can be commonly observed in practice. This study investigates the design of such trade-in subsidy programs and aims to provide implementable insights for practice. In particular, we focus on two open problems in the literature, (i) how to optimally allocate the subsidy budget among the multiple products covered by the trade-in program, and (ii) how to most effectively utilize the assigned budget to incentivize consumer trade-ins for each product. We develop a three-stage Stackelberg game model that captures the essence of the interaction between the government's subsidy decision, the manufacturer's trade-in rebate decision, and the consumer's product replacement decision. We show that a sharing subsidy scheme under which the government subsidy is proportional to the manufacturer's rebate is more effective in encouraging consumer trade-ins than fixed-amount subsidies. Moreover, a product with a higher environmental impact, a larger market size, a longer lifespan, or a lower value to consumers typically demands a larger subsidy budget allocation. We further use our results to derive a simple proportional budget allocation rule that can provide robust and near-optimal performance. We illustrate our results by a case study based on the "old-for-new" program in China that subsidizes home appliance trade-ins. Our results indicate that policy makers should pay attention to the correlation between government subsidies and manufacturer's rebate as well as key product and market characteristics when designing a subsidy scheme for trade-in programs.
机译：政府补贴在实践中常常观察到速度补贴加速消费者产品的消费者贸易。本研究调查了这种贸易补贴计划的设计，旨在为实践提供可实现的见解。特别是，我们专注于文献中的两个公开问题，（i）如何在商品计划所涵盖的多个产品中最佳地分配补贴预算，并如何最有效地利用分配的预算来激励消费者每种产品的商品。我们开发了一个三阶段的Stackelberg游戏模型，捕获了政府补贴决定与制造商的折扣决策和消费者产品替代决定之间的互动的本质。我们表明，政府补贴的分享补贴计划与制造商的回扣成正比，更有效地鼓励消费者贸易依赖于固定金额补贴。此外，具有较高环境影响的产品，更大的市场规模，更长的寿命或对消费者的较低价值通常要求更大的补贴预算分配。我们进一步使用我们的结果来推导出简单的比例预算分配规则，可以提供强大和近最佳性能。我们通过基于中国的“旧版”计划补贴了家电商品的“旧”计划来说明我们的结果。我们的结果表明，政策制定者应注意政府补贴和制造商之间的相关性，以及在设计贸易方案的补贴计划时，重点产品和市场特征。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号