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State predation in historical perspective: the case of Ottoman musadere practice during 1695-1839

机译：从历史角度看国家掠夺：1695年至1839年期间的奥斯曼游击队手法

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This paper studies the practice of Musadere in the Ottoman Empire. Musadere refers to the expropriation of elites-often tax farmers or administrators-by the Sultan. This practice is interesting from both political economy and economic history perspectives as the Ottoman Empire continued to increase its reliance on it during the eighteenth century, a period when European states were investing in fiscal capacity and building bureaucratic tax systems. The main argument is that Sultans faced a "political Laffer curve:" if revenue is too low, the state collapses; if fiscal extraction is too high there is a rebellion and the Sultan risks losing power. While expropriations (musadere) allow the Sultan to keep taxes low, they are vulnerable to provoking elites to invest in fugitive rather than (more productive) captive assets. We also show that the Sultan is more prone to target politically strong elites when his fiscal capacity is low.
机译：本文研究了奥斯曼帝国Musadere的实践。 Musadere是指苏丹对精英（通常是税农或管理人员）的没收。从政治经济学和经济历史的角度来看，这种作法都很有趣，因为奥斯曼帝国在18世纪继续增加对它的依赖，当时欧洲各国正在投资建立财政能力并建立官僚税收制度。主要论点是苏丹面临着“政治拉弗曲线”：如果收入太低，国家就会垮台;如果财政收入太高，就会造反，苏丹有失去权力的风险。虽然征收（穆萨德）可以使苏丹维持较低的税收水平，但它们很容易激怒精英投资于逃犯而非（更具生产力的）俘虏资产。我们还表明，苏丹在财政能力低下时，更倾向于针对政治上有实力的精英。

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