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Advertising competition in presidential elections

机译：总统选举中的广告竞争

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摘要

Presidential candidates purchase advertising based on each state's potential to tip the election. The structure of the Electoral College concentrates spending in battleground states, such that a majority of voters are ignored. We estimate an equilibrium model of multimarket advertising competition between candidates that allows for endogenously determined budgets. In a Direct Vote counterfactual, we find advertising would be spread more evenly across states, but total spending levels can either decrease or increase depending on the contestability of the popular vote. Spending would increase by 13 % in the extremely narrow 2000 election, but would decrease by 54 % in 2004. These results suggest that the Electoral College greatly increases advertising spending in typical elections.
机译：总统候选人根据每个州推翻选举的潜力购买广告。选举学院的结构将支出集中在战场上，因此大多数选民都被忽略了。我们估计候选人之间的多市场广告竞争的均衡模型，该模型允许内生确定预算。在直接投票的反事实中，我们发现广告在各州之间的分布会更加均匀，但是总支出水平可能会降低，也可能会增加，这取决于大众投票的可竞争性。在极为狭窄的2000年选举中，支出将增长13％，但在2004年将下降54％。这些结果表明，选举学院在典型的选举中大大增加了广告支出。

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