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Manufacturer marketing initiatives and retailer information sharing

机译：制造商营销计划和零售商信息共享

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This research examines a retailer's incentive to share information with its supplier when the supplier can also undertake initiatives to increase retail demand. It is well known that a retailer is averse to sharing market information with a manufacturer due to concern for a manufacturer's strategic use of such information. This research shows that despite such strategic exploitation of market information, a retailer may want to establish information sharing channels with its supplier. Information sharing essentially shifts power upstream which, in turn, enhances the manufacturer's incentive to bear costs to boost retail demand: the manufacturer is induced to invest merely by knowing that information is on its way. Hence, the retailer benefits from information sharing ex ante despite the costly ex post exploitation by the manufacturer. This finding is a stark contrast to the most of previous results which consistently point out how bad it is for the manufacturer to have the retailer's demand information before setting prices. In fact, due to the investment effect, information sharing can lead to gains for the retailer, manufacturer, and consumers alike.
机译：这项研究考察了零售商在供应商还可以采取措施增加零售需求时与供应商共享信息的动机。众所周知，由于担心制造商策略性地使用这种信息，零售商不愿与制造商共享市场信息。这项研究表明，尽管对市场信息进行了这样的战略性利用，零售商仍可能希望与其供应商建立信息共享渠道。信息共享从本质上将权力转移到上游，从而增强了制造商承担成本以刺激零售需求的动机：仅通过知道信息正在传播，就可以诱使制造商进行投资。因此，尽管制造商事后开发成本高昂，但零售商仍可从事前信息共享中受益。这一发现与大多数以前的结果形成了鲜明的对比，后者始终指出制造商在设定价格之前掌握零售商的需求信息是多么糟糕。实际上，由于投资效应，信息共享可以为零售商，制造商和消费者带来收益。

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