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Universal banking and financial architecture

机译：通用银行和金融架构

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Discussions of systemic risk after the financial crisis of 2007-09 have focused heavily on so-called "sys-temically important financial institutions" (SIFls) a cohort of financial firms that is almost exclusively (but not necessarily) comprised of large, complex and heavily interconnected financial conglomerates. This paper considers the economic and strategic drivers of SIFIs - if such institutions are a key source of systemic risk, it is important to understand how and why they get that way. The paper then sets forth a public-interest perspective on the financial architecture by setting out key benchmarks - static and dynamic efficiency, stability and robustness, and competitiveness - and the tradeoffs that exist between them, and examines how SIFls can support or detract from these benchmarks. If SIFIs are to be subject to much sharper prudential regulation, its impact must be calibrated against systemic performance benchmarks. Finally, the paper focuses on some of the major regulatory initiatives following the 2007-09 financial crisis, and in particular the US Dodd-Frank legislation of 2010, in terms of their possible impact on business models of SIFIs. The paper concludes that improving the financial architecture in a disciplined, consistent, internationally coordinated and sustained manner with a firm eye to the public interest should ultimately be centered on market discipline. By being forced to pay a significant price for the negative externalities SIFIs generate - in the form of systemic risk - managers and boards will have to draw their own conclusions regarding optimum institutional strategy and structure in the context of the microeconomics and industrial organization of global financial intermediation. If this fails, constraints on their size, complexity and interconnectedness will be a major part of the policy reaction to the next financial crisis.
机译：关于2007-09年金融危机后的系统性风险的讨论主要集中在所谓的“系统重要性金融机构”（SIFls），这是一组金融公司，几乎全部（但不一定）由大型，复杂和高度相互联系的金融集团。本文考虑了SIFI的经济和战略驱动因素-如果此类机构是系统性风险的关键来源，那么了解它们如何以及为什么以这种方式产生，这一点很重要。然后，本文通过列出关键基准（静态和动态效率，稳定性和健壮性以及竞争力）以及它们之间的权衡关系，阐述了金融体系的公共利益观点，并研究了SIFls如何支持或削弱这些基准。基准。如果要对SIFI进行更严格的审慎监管，则必须对照系统性能基准来校准其影响。最后，本文就2007-09年金融危机后的一些主要监管举措，特别是2010年美国多德-弗兰克法案，对SIFIs商业模式可能产生的影响进行了重点介绍。本文的结论是，以纪律，一致，国际协调和持续的方式改进金融体系结构，并坚定地关注公共利益，最终应将重点放在市场纪律上。通过迫使SIFI以系统性风险的形式为负外部性付出高昂的代价，管理者和董事会将不得不就全球经济的微观经济学和产业组织背景下的最佳体制战略和结构得出自己的结论。中介。如果这种方法失败了，那么对它们的规模，复杂性和相互联系的限制将是对下一次金融危机的政策反应的主要部分。

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